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Analyzing a difficult subject that pervades contract law and which is vital to the 
national economy, many scholars have written about boilerplate contracts. With her 
2013 book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law, 
Professor Margaret Jane Radin weighs in on the discussion. In a complement to 
existing contract remedies against abusive boilerplate, she proposes a new tort that 
she calls “intentional deprivation of basic legal rights.” She also identifies another 
new tort theory that deems abusive boilerplate to be a defective “product” under the 
law of products liability.  
Radin further contends that these merchant practices with their wide scale 
forfeiture of citizen rights threaten the democratic order previously maintained by 
the state’s legal rights regime. Radin terms this latter phenomenon “democratic 
degradation.” Radin’s tort reforms for alleviating this perceived degradation are the 
focus of this Article. 
Although her book has achieved great renown, receiving high praise from a 
number of prominent commentators, with plaudits such as “groundbreaking,” “a 
great achievement,” and a “masterpiece,” I respectfully suggest that her reforms have 
problems on doctrinal and normative grounds. In my Article, I summarize the 
author’s argument, identify my concerns, and propose an alternative formulation. My 
counter-thesis is that expanded merchant tort liability is unnecessary and 
counterproductive. Case law and statutory law already provide courts with effective 
remedial tools; furthermore, these doctrines take a pro-consumer perspective in key 
areas of mass market standard form contracting.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have stated that “[T]here is little doubt that the treatment of 
standard contracts is one of the most important puzzles facing modern contract law--
and perhaps one of the most difficult.”1 Other authors have observed that “[s]tandard 
form contracts pervade the consumer arena” and are “vital to the continued 
functioning of the economy.”2 In her 2013 book, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
                                                                                                                                          
 1 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale 
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2012). 
 2 Id. at 27; see also Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory—Three Views of the 
Cathedral, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2343919) (“Few topics in the past few decades have attracted more attention in 
contract scholarship than standard-form contracts, and rightly so.” Also stating “there is 
hardly a more pressing challenge facing contract law.”); Michael M. Greenfield & Linda J. 
Rusch, Limits on Standard-Form Contracting in Revised Article 2, 32 UCC L.J. 115, 115 
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Vanishing Rights And The Rule Of Law, Professor Margaret Jane Radin weighs in on 
the discussion, criticizing what she calls the widespread use of rights deletion 
“schemes.”3 Radin’s book has achieved great renown in the legal and popular press, 
winning plaudits such as “thoughtfully crafted,” “groundbreaking,” “compelling,” “a 
great achievement,” “eloquent and powerful” and “a masterpiece.”4 In her thesis, 
                                                                                                                                          
(1999) (“The use of standard-form documents pervades commercial transactions and is almost 
universal in consumer transactions.”). For some of the main works in this area, see Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); 
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Justin P. Green, Comment, The 
Consumer-Redistributive Stance: A Perspective on Restoring Balance To Transactions 
Involving Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 46 AKRON L. REV. 551 (2013). 
 3 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2013); see id. at 198, 216, 244 (referring to “abusive” boilerplate); id. at 16, 
17, 18, 33, 35 (making numerous references to “boilerplate rights deletion schemes”). Radin is 
the Henry King Ransom Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and William 
Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law, Emerita, at Stanford University. 
 4 See, e.g., David Horton, Mass Arbitration And Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
459, 464 (2014) (a “dense and sprawling masterpiece”); Hugh J. Treacy, Book Review, 105 L LIBR. 
J. 369, 376-77 (2013) (“[W]e now have a thoughtfully crafted work of scholarship that will challenge 
readers to achieve new understandings of contract law within our print and electronic boilerplate 
world.”) (also calling her book “a groundbreaking work”); Recent Publications, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1178, 1178 (2013) (“This insightful book engages with an omnipresent issue in the modern economy 
and will assist policymakers and courts alike in their attempts to protect consumers.”); Robert Nagel, 
Devil’s in the Small Print, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323981504578177310628472592 (a “sophisticated and thought-provoking 
treatment”); Glenn C. Altschuler, (Not So) Fine Print, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2012, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/glenn-c-altschuler/legal-boilerplate_b_2231026.html (“Radin makes 
a compelling case that boilerplate constitutes a clear and present danger to our core values.”); Oren 
Bar-Gill, Boilerplate Symposium VII: Oren Bar-Gill on Consent Without Reading, CONTRACTSPROF 
BLOG (May 21, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-
symposium-vii-oren-bar-gill-on-consent-without-reading-.html (“Professor Radin’s book is an 
eloquent and powerful critique of the fine-term, boilerplate contracts that pervade modern life . . . . 
Radin’s book is a great achievement.”); Theresa Amato, Boilerplate Symposium II: Theresa Amato 
on Remedies to the Problems Posed by Boilerplate, CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 14, 2013),  
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-ii-theresa- 
amato-on-remedies-to-the-problems-posed-by-boilerplate.html (“Professor Radin’s masterpiece 
Boilerplate sets forth the intellectual underpinnings for an energetic movement to correct the 
imbalance of power between corporations and consumers in fine print contracts.”). 
  Several commentators have given Radin’s book lukewarm reviews. See Michelle A. 
Boardman, Consent and Sensibility, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1967 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883 (2014). Radin’s 
rejoinder criticizes both reviewers as distorting and misinterpreting her book because of their 
bias for “old school Chicago economics.” See Margaret Jane Radin, What Boilerplate Said: A 
Response to Omri Ben-Shahar (and a Diagnosis) (Feb. 26, 2014). U of Michigan Public Law 
Research Paper No. 392; U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 14-006, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401720 
(criticizing Ben-Shahar); Margaret Jane Radin, Of Priors and Of Disconnects, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 259, 260 (2014) (criticizing Boardman) While this is suggested citation on the SSRN 
site, is this the correct BB citation?. Professor Brian Bix calls her book “impressive” and 
“provocative” but also questions whether some of her contentions are “overstated in ways that 
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Radin argues that traditional contract theories and existing judicial remedies have 
“failed” in addressing problematic boilerplate contracts.5 She saves much of her 
criticism for the judicial approach to contractually-binding arbitration. New remedies 
are essential, Radin believes, because widespread boilerplate “schemes” improperly 
sacrifice core individual legal rights.6 
To remedy such practices, Radin’s principal solution is to reconceptualize 
“some” improper boilerplate under the law of tort.7 Therefore, Radin suggests the 
expansion of tort law as her centerpiece reform.8 In a complement to existing 
contract remedies against “abusive” boilerplate, she proposes a broad new tort that 
she calls “intentional deprivation of basic legal rights.”9 She also identifies another 
new tort theory that deems abusive boilerplate to be a defective “product” under the 
law of products liability.10  
Her proposal to expand the tort law system to remedy boilerplate overreaching 
has attracted especially high praise from respected academic commentators. For 
example, Professor Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago Law School, 
while noting the plaintiff’s difficulties in proving harm, calls Radin’s suggestion on 
tort reform a “welcome new framework” and “an immensely creative idea, surely to 
become a legacy of the book, and it deserves careful attention . . . .”11 In a second 
example, Professor Daniel Schwarz of the University of Minnesota Law School 
observes that “[o]ne of the most provocative arguments in Margaret Jane Radin’s 
bold and compelling book, Boilerplate, is that legal evaluation of contracts of 
adhesion should employ tort principles rather than contract principles.”12 Yet another 
commentator, Hugh J. Treacy of the Whittier Law School, observes that “[h]er most 
significant solution . . .is to classify boilerplate rights deletions within the umbrella 
of tort law.”13  
While I commend Radin for her accessible, thought-provoking writing style and 
for her numerous interesting discussions of economics, philosophy and ethics, I 
respectfully disagree with those commentators praising Radin’s proposed broad use 
of tort law. The reason is her suggested expansion of tort law has serious flaws on 
                                                                                                                                          
distort the analysis.” Brian H. Bix, Freedom of Contract and “Democratic Degradation,” 49 
TULSA L. REV. 501, 501-02 (2013). None of the reviewers challenges in any depth Radin’s 
doctrinal descriptions and analysis.  
 5 RADIN, supra note 3, at 17, 123-42. 
 6 Id. at 16-18. 
 7 Id. at 197-216 (targeting severe remedy deletions of consumer rights that are at least 
partially market inalienable under circumstances of non-consent). 
 8 Id. at 213-15.  
 9 Id. at 198, 211, 212, 216, 244.  
 10 Id. at 198-99, 222-23. 
 11 Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 902 . 
 12 See Daniel Schwarcz, Boilerplate Symposium VIII: Daniel Schwarcz on a Tort-Based 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts, CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 21, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-viii-
.html. 
 13 Treacy, supra note 4, at 377  
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both doctrinal and normative grounds. For Radin’s normative criticisms of the 
American legal system to be valid, she must first show that her criticisms of the 
underlying legal doctrines are correct. Absent such proof, her thesis is unpersuasive. 
As I will show, Radin’s explicit suggestion for a “tort takeover” of what she calls 
“abusive” mass market boilerplate14 departs in a detrimental way from the 
fundamental principles of the tort compensation system.  In my Article, I will 
summarize the author’s argument, identify my concerns and propose an alternative 
approach. My counter thesis is that expanded tort liability is unnecessary and 
counterproductive because both case law and statutory law already provide courts 
with effective remedial tools. Radin also does not disclose that these existing 
doctrines take a vigorous pro-consumer perspective in key areas of mass market 
standard form contracting. 
A detailed overview of Radin’s thesis will aid the discussion. Radin begins with 
the concept that contracts inhabit Worlds A or B. Archetype “World A” contracts are 
the traditional “bargained-for exchanges” between two parties where each party 
consents voluntarily and exercises “free choice.” This contract type is “typified” by a 
process of negotiation where, under the ideal of “freedom of contract,” both parties 
are satisfied with the agreement.15  
Archetype “World B” (“purported”) contracts occur without “actual consent” 
where the consumer enters into contracts “without knowing it, or at least without 
being able to do anything about it.” Radin posits that World B mass market 
boilerplate contracts lack the “indispensable” elements of a recognized contractual 
“bargain” and “voluntary” consumer choice and therefore are only “purported 
contracts.”16 World B contracts do not fit the “theory” or “rationale” of contract 
law.17 These so-called contracts, she says, come in the form of documents “imposed 
upon consumers” where (1) the merchant asks the consumer to sign, (2) the contract 
contains terms that are binding without the consumer’s signature, or (3) the 
consumer might not even know that he is entering a contract. In sum, “World B is 
the world of boilerplate”18 and boilerplate “consistently shrinks legal rights to the 
vanishing point.”19 Thus, Radin concludes that a World B contract is one where 
                                                                                                                                          
 14 RADIN, supra note 3, at 198, 210, 216. 
 15 Id. at 3, 14. Radin has argued that she does not place World A and World B in an “either-
or” dichotomy but that these concepts are on a “continuum.” See Radin, Of Priors and Of 
Disconnects, supra note 4, at 262 (responding to Boardman, supra note 4). To the contrary, as 
noted by a sympathetic reviewer, “While Professor Radin is right that there are distinguishable 
Worlds of contract, she does not make clear enough that the two Worlds are on a continuum; they 
are not so clearly dichotomous.” Peter Alces, Boilerplate Symposium I: Peter Alces on Consent, 
CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 13, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/ 
2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-i-peter-alces-on-consent.html. 
 16 Id. at 3, 8, 10-12, 20, 22, 30, 158, 213;see also id. at 81 (World B contracts are based on 
a “distorted notion of voluntariness”). 
 17 Id. at 14.  
 18 Id. at 9. Varieties of World B contracts include standardized adhesion contracts, offsite 
terms, shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses, rolling contracts, and end user license agreements. 
Id. at 10-11. 
 19 Id. at 30. 
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“contract theory becomes contract mythology” as it transports users “into an 
alternative legal universe.”20  
Radin acknowledges that the law considers the boilerplate of World B to be a 
“valid method of contract formation.” 21 Nevertheless, she accuses the “defenders” of 
World B contracts of unsuccessfully trying to “shoehorn” [or gerrymander] them 
into the World A “paradigm of contractual consent.”22 Radin further contends that 
these World B documents with their dense legalese often contain unfair terms that 
can keep the consumer in the dark (“sheer ignorance”) as these transactions unduly 
favor the seller.23 Thus, a major component of Radin’s thesis is that the extensive 
presence of mass market boilerplate contracts in the economy has degraded the 
traditional elements of consent, agreement, and contract to the point where 
consumers are commonly being bound involuntarily.24 Radin calls this effect 
“normative degradation.”25  
Rejecting utilitarian notions that economic efficiency can justify the extensive 
use of such “abusive” boilerplate,26 Radin’s guiding principle for reform is that mass 
market distribution contracts are improper when they accomplish severe remedy 
deletions of consumer rights that are at least partially market inalienable under 
circumstances of non-consent.27 In Radin’s view, these subjugated rights include, but 
are not limited to, the right against oppressive forum selection clauses, the right to a 
jury trial, the right against exculpatory clauses that unduly favor the seller, and the 
right against overly restrictive limits on remedies in consumer sales.28 She also 
believes that these merchant practices with their wide scale forfeiture of citizen 
rights threaten the democratic order previously maintained by the state’s legal rights 
regime.29 Radin terms this latter phenomenon “democratic degradation.”30 Radin’s 
reforms for alleviating this perceived degradation are the focus of this Article.  
                                                                                                                                          
 20 Id. at 7, 8, 12, 17, 210. 
 21 Id. at 12, 30. 
 22 Id. at 19, 31; see also id. at 82 (stating World B transactions use a “gerrymandered” 
concept of “agreement.”). 
 23 Id. at 21-23, 30, 31, 92, 123, 128, 156, 163; see also id. at 83 (discussing this 
phenomenon with insurance policies). 
 24 Id. at 15, 16, 18, 29-31 (discussing at length the “devolution of voluntary agreement” in 
modern consumer contracts). 
 25 Id. at 15-16, 19-32. I have addressed this aspect of Radin’s book in a separate Article. 
See Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation and Mass Market Standard 
Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and 
the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2014). 
 26 RADIN, supra note 3, at 64-66, 71-72, 102, 172, 174. 
 27 Id. at 159, 164, 172, 198, 211. “Partial market inalienability” refers to where a court 
applies strict scrutiny to a person’s sale of his right. Id. at 157, 161, 172. “Market inalienable” 
means a legal right cannot be for sale at any price. Id. at 159. 
 28 See infra Section IV. 
 29 RADIN, supra note 3, at 16, 39-45. 
 30 Id. at 33-51.  
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While Radin primarily presents a critique of current contract law on normative 
grounds, she also recites and criticizes numerous doctrinal principles of law. Thus, 
for example, Radin provides an in-depth treatment of current tort law doctrines in 
Chapter Eleven, “Boilerplate as a Tort.”31 Radin herself acknowledges in Chapter 
Seven, “Evaluating Current Judicial Oversight,” that it is proper to see how well 
current legal doctrine deals with the validity of boilerplate before it can be decided 
whether her normative criticisms are valid and that reforms are needed.32 Ironically, 
she leaves out a number of arguments that would have aided her cause to a degree, 
which I have included in various sections below. 
By contrast, I will perform a balanced case law and statutory analysis 
demonstrating that her suggested tort remedies in a detrimental way contradict many 
established tort principles. Because she omits or incompletely states various legal 
doctrines, Radin presents an unpersuasive case for supplementing contract remedies 
with these new tort theories. Therefore, they have little or no chance of being 
accepted by courts or legislatures. 
Regarding the organization of this Article, the first section considers the courts 
and their prerogatives to create new torts. This section will address which bodies—
courts or legislatures—are best suited to recognize such new causes of action. The 
second section will examine the general theory behind her proposal to use tort 
remedies for solving contracting issues. Thus, the initial section will consider the 
general principles for judicial recognition of new torts. Subtopics include: tort, 
contract, and the availability of mass remedies; tort law as an alternative remedy for 
improper boilerplate; the divide between tort and contract; the necessary techniques 
for separating contract and tort; and the sound policies that distinguish contract from 
tort. 
The next section address Radin’s centerpiece tort remedy, the proposed tort of 
intentional deprivation of basic legal rights. As I will demonstrate below, general tort 
doctrine fails to support her new theories in numerous respects. I will then consider 
four of Radin’s principal candidates for implementing this proposed tort: (1) forum 
selection clauses, (2) contractual jury trial waivers, (3) the rule under Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-719(2) that where circumstances cause an exclusive 
or limited remedy “to fail of its essential purpose,” remedies may be had as allowed 
by the U.C.C., and (4) exculpatory clauses for consumer harms arising from seller 
negligence. The next section explores her suggestion that “boilerplate rights deletion 
schemes” qualify as a basis for products liability in tort. 
I will then discuss Radin’s strong condemnation of contractually-binding 
arbitration and whether this technique is an engine of consumer oppression or a 
legitimate informal dispute resolution mechanism. The last topic in this section is the 
                                                                                                                                          
 31 Some of the topics she addresses in this Chapter (pp. 197-216) are the common law 
creation of new torts; the ability of tort law to address mass torts; products liability law; the 
distinction and border between tort and contract; blended tort and contracts principles in areas 
such as fraud or misrepresentation, medical malpractice, bad faith breach of contract; 
warranty, with special emphasis on the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases; 
damages in areas such as punitive damages, emotional distress and pain and suffering; 
proximate cause; impact of the Uniform Commercial Code; and the doctrine of assumption of 
the risk. Id. at 197-216. 
 32 Id. at 123 (“Before considering what is to be done about boilerplate, we should take a 
look at what is now being done about it.”). 
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U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,33 which Radin 
believes improperly restricts class action relief for abusive boilerplate. 
In sum, if enacted, Radin’s tort reforms would inappropriately result in the full or 
partial “tortification” of the remedies available under the American mass market 
contracting system. The actual state of legal doctrine in the United States does not 
support Radin’s claimed view of democratic degradation. This sea change also 
carries a high risk of significant unintended (and adverse) consequences.34 One such 
consequence would be that merchants facing greater liabilities would charge 
consumers higher prices, the same consumers that Radin champions so passionately. 
As I will demonstrate, these unintended harms also carry a high potential for 
seriously damaging both tort and contract law doctrine when one considers that 
approximately ninety-nine percent of all contracts in the United States economy are 
standard form mass market consumer contracts.35 
II. COURTS AND THE CREATION OF NEW TORTS 
Radin contends that common law courts have residual authority to create new 
torts when “[t]he need arises to recognize a category of injury.”36 Radin gives the 
example that after a famous 1890 law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, courts exercised their common law authority to recognize new torts 
protecting personal privacy, such as proscribing the unauthorized use of a person’s 
name and likeness.37 Because of this residual authority in tort, Radin believes that 
courts can examine abusive boilerplate contracts and create a new tort of “intentional 
deprivation of basic legal rights.”38 She also endorses the expansion of the law of 
products liability to designate abusive boilerplate as a defective product. 39 Radin 
could have further emphasized that although her theory is novel, the mere fact a tort 
theory attempts to fill what Radin sees as an “open space in the law” does not 
necessarily render it without merit.40 
While Radin is correct that a court may define and change common law tort 
principles, I will show that Radin’s description of a court’s common law authority is 
                                                                                                                                          
 33 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 34 Konrad J. Friedemann defines the law of unintended consequences as “the proposition 
that every undertaking, however well-intentioned, is generally accompanied by unforeseen 
repercussions that can overshadow the principal endeavor.” See GOOGLE ANSWERS (Mar. 14, 
2003), http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=176107; see also Rob Norton, 
Unintended Consequences, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), http:// 
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (“The law of unintended 
consequences . . . is that actions of people—and especially of government—always have 
effects that are unanticipated or unintended.”).  
 35 See Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990) (citing W. David Slawson, 
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
529, 529 (1971)). 
 36 RADIN, supra note 3, at 198. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1939).   
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incomplete. One of those omissions is that courts are divided on their prerogative to 
create or expand torts. Therefore, before embarking on deciding whether her new 
tort theories have merit, Radin should have analyzed why and whether a court may 
exercise this power in the first place. The second major gap in her exposition of the 
law is that when a court exercises this authority, most jurisdictions apply a multi-
factor test for determining whether they should accept a new cause of action in tort. 
A. Judicial v. Legislative Competence 
In my first concern, noted above, Radin does not mention that some courts 
decline altogether to create a new action in tort.  Their rationale is that legislatures 
have better institutional capability than courts to assess the competing public policy 
considerations that go with the task of allowing new forms of liability.41 The New 
York Court of Appeals has pointed to the greater efficiencies for this task associated 
with legislative versus judicial action: 
The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to 
discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, 
to elicit the views of the various segments of the community that would 
be directly affected and in any event critically interested, and to 
investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability. 
. . . . 
[If liability is to be expanded,] it should be accomplished through a 
principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public 
ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution of the 
partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.42 
As Hans Linde, a prominent former Oregon Supreme Court justice, has observed 
regarding judges and the reformulation of tort law, “[j]udges gain nothing for the law 
by entering the marketplace for policymakers.”43 
By contrast, other jurisdictions more freely recognize that courts may create new 
torts. Some courts claim the inherent authority to do so, which power may come 
from a state constitution, a statute or the common law.44 A few of these courts claim 
an especially broad common law power to create new law. For this proposition, the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Nees v. Hocks (which remains good law) 
is noteworthy.  In considering the proposed new tort of wrongful employee 
discharge, the Nees court commented “[w]e have not hesitated to create or recognize 
                                                                                                                                          
 41 Murphy v. Am. Home Prods Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983); Accent Store 
Design v. Marathon House, 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996) (“We have long held . . . that the 
creation of new causes of action is a legislative function.”). The Chief Justice of the Alabama 
Supreme Court has written extensively on this point, arguing that the creation of a new cause 
of action is a legislative function and that the state Constitution under the separation of powers 
forbids courts desirous of recognizing a new tort from exercising legislative powers. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brechbill, 144 So. 3d 248 (Ala. 2013) (Moore, C.J., concurring 
specially). 
 42 Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90. 
 43 Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: “Public Policy” Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 821, 855 (1994). 
 44 E.g., Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1173 (Conn. 2006). 
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new torts when confronted with conduct causing injuries which we feel should be 
compensable.”45  More specifically, in accepting the new tort cause of action, the 
Oregon high court said the issue comes down to two factors. The two factors the 
Oregon Supreme Court considered were whether “[f]or want of a precedent [the 
courts] are impotent to grant redress for injury resulting from conduct which 
universal opinion in a state of civilized society would unhesitatingly condemn. . .” or 
whether “[t]he common law, with its capacity for growth and expansion and its 
adaptability to the needs and requirements of changing conditions, contains within 
itself the resources of principle upon which relief in such a case can be founded.”46 
Based on Nees v. Hocks, a high bar exists that even in a generous jurisdiction 
such as Oregon considering new tort liability, there must be a “universal opinion” in 
a “civilized society” that the conduct at issue should be “unhesitatingly 
condemned.”47 No “universal” consensus exists that “abusive” boilerplate is such a 
detrimental practice; Radin concedes as much as she writes disparagingly of the so-
called “apologists”—including courts—that defend the current system.48  
B. The Courts’ Multi-Factor Test 
In my second concern with Radin’s brief summary of the law, she oversimplifies 
matters greatly as she fails to disclose that most state courts claiming the power to 
create new theories of tort liability follow a complex multi-factor test. These 
jurisdictions “tread cautiously” in creating new torts, citing the need to discourage 
both duplicative litigation and the inefficient relitigation of issues “better handled 
within the context of the core cause of action.”49  
While moral and logical judgments for these jurisdictions are significant 
elements of the decision to create a new tort,50 most courts put more emphasis on 
carefully balancing the needs to (1) compensate the victim, (2) admonish the 
wrongdoer and (3) impose liability for consequential damages ensuring that 
otherwise proper conduct will not be unduly impacted.51 For these judges, perhaps 
the most difficult task is drawing a line between “[p]roviding a remedy to everyone 
who is injured and of extending exposure to tort liability almost without limit.”52 A 
California court lists the major criteria as: 
                                                                                                                                          
 45 Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514 (Or. 1975).  
 46 Id. Interestingly, the Nees court acknowledged that “[s]ome portions of the bench and 
bar are of the opinion that the court has been too unrestrained” in recognizing a new tort. This 
passage shows that the Oregon court might have doubted the wisdom of the breadth of its 
authority. Id. at 514 n.1. A related critique is that Radin rarely identifies these so-called 
apologists or includes their exact arguments.  
 47 Id. at 514. 
 48 RADIN, supra note 3, at 198. 
 49 E.g., Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc., 386 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Ark. 2012); Rees v. 
Smith, 301 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Ark. 2009).  
 50 Mulvey v. Cuviello, 687 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
 51 Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1173-74 (Conn. 2006). 
 52 Mulvey, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 587. 
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The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to 
the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent 
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.53  
Numerous other principles of restraint govern the courts’ decision making in this 
area. Most courts considering a new tort will weigh the need to meet society’s 
changing requirements against the prospect of boundless claims in an already 
crowded judicial system.54 In another policy, courts “[w]ill decline to recognize a 
new cause of action if there are sufficient other avenues, short of creating a new 
cause of action, that serve to remedy the situation for a plaintiff.”55 Yet another 
restriction, according to some decisions, is where a statute identifies a specific civil 
remedy for a violation; that legislative choice will pre-empt an implied cause of 
action in tort.56 Addressing the problems inherent for measuring loss is also part of 
the analysis.57 The result is that creating a proposed new cause of action in tort must 
accord with the reason for the tort liability system58 and the felt need of the common 
                                                                                                                                          
 53 Burns v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130 (Ct. App. 2009) (listing 
considerations). Several other states follow different criteria in applying their multi-factor test. 
For example, Minnesota follows a set of other factors. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 
300, 304 (Minn. 2007) ( “In deciding whether to recognize a common law tort, this court 
looks to (1) whether the tort is inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-established 
common law right, (2) whether the tort has been recognized in other common law states, (3) 
whether recognition of a cause of action will create tension with other applicable laws, and (4) 
whether such tension is out-weighed by the importance of the additional protections that 
recognition of the claim would provide to injured persons.”).  
 54 Rees, 301 S.W.3d at 471. But see Dale v. Dale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 522 (Ct. App. 
1998) (“[A]nticipated flood of trifling lawsuits are not relevant in an intentional tort case.”). 
 55 Rees, 301 S.W.3d at 471; see also Neelthak Dev. Corp. v. Twp. of Gloucester, 639 A.2d 
1141, 1144 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“Where existing concepts of law provide the 
claimant with the potential for full recovery in a pending proceeding, no such need exists [to 
recognize a new cause of action in tort].”); Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & 
Teslovich, Inc., 496 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Georgia courts are reluctant to 
approve new torts, even if other states have accepted them, when a “full and adequate 
remedy” already exists for the injury. Kaye v. Dupree (In re Avado Brands, Inc.), 358 B.R. 
868, 887 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (applying Georgia law).    
 56 Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 538 (Utah 2002). 
 57 Burns, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 136. 
 58 Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998) (“The common thread 
woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others.”); 
Waters v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225 (1987) (“At its foundation, [the common law of 
torts is] a means of apportioning risks and allocating the burden of loss.”); OMI Holdings v. 
Howell, 918 P.2d 1274, 1293 (Kan. 1996) (decision to recognize a new tort should involve 
consideration of the circumstances of all potential plaintiffs). 
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law to adjust to changing social conditions. 59 Radin’s brief analysis of tort law 
captures none of these nuances. 
In light of the above principles, her proposals cannot pass muster under the 
multi-factor test. First, her proposed tort takeover of the mass market contracting 
system would likely create a wave of boundless claims in an already crowded 
judicial system and an undue financial burden upon prospective defendants and the 
community at large. Second, the merchant’s mere use of boilerplate is morally 
blameless because courts properly reason that “[t]he very ubiquity of the practice 
precludes a conclusion that the use of a nonnegotiable contract, on its own, is in any 
way unethical.”60 Third, the law recognizes numerous adequate contract defenses to 
abusive boilerplate, such as laches, estoppel, waiver, fraud, duress, reasonable 
expectations, public policy, and unconscionability.61 This comprehensive choice of 
existing remedies is fully able to address all boilerplate deficiencies—which differ 
from whether a particular plaintiff can meet its burden of proof.  
Given the high bar for judicial acceptance of new causes of action, when a party 
seeks to convince a court to bring a new tort cause of action into the legal world, the 
usual outcome is “countless refusals” by judges.62  By emphasizing the relatively 
few instances where courts have created new torts, and by leaving out the many 
times where courts reject proposed new tort causes of action, Radin’s description of 
the common law landscape is incomplete. Accordingly, courts and legislatures 
should carefully consider all the ramifications before adopting Radin’s plan to 
hamper the use of standard form contracts, a business tool (when legitimate) that 
“[i]s essential to the functioning of the economy.”63  
                                                                                                                                          
 59 Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1995) (“[T]he common law is dynamic and a 
court can modify it to meet changing conditions.”) (rejecting proposed tort theory of an 
implied warranty of habitability for rental premises in the law of landlord-tenant); Koster v. 
Scotch Assocs., 640 A.2d 1225, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (indicating that tort law develops 
based on the “felt needs” at the time); Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 267 P.3d 1238, 
1246 (Haw. 2011) (“Tort law is primarily designed to vindicate social policy.”). 
 60 Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 787 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 61 See infra note 402 and accompanying text. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a 
number of equitable doctrines that can remedy merchant over-reaching in the use of adhesion 
contracts, including the doctrines of estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, breach of the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the rule of construction that ambiguous language is to 
be resolved against the drafter. Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805–
07 & nn.11-16 (Utah 1992). 
 62 Anita Bernstein, How To Make A New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 
1546 n.38 (1997) (citing decisions). Federal judges are usually reluctant to create new torts 
under state law. See Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Servs. Office, 74 F.3d 778, 785-86 (7th Cir. 
1996) (Posner, C.J.) (“[W]hat Great Central really wants . . . is for us to create in the name of 
Illinois law a new tort . . . . We keep warning the bar that a plaintiff who needs a common law 
departure or innovation to win should bring his suit in state court rather than in federal 
court.”). But see Prescription Plan Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(“In appropriate cases, federal courts may recognize or create common-law torts.”). 
 63 See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 
(rev. ed. 1993). 
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III. TORT AS A REMEDY FOR “ABUSIVE” BOILERPLATE  
Radin argues that tort is a better conceptual fit than contract to address mass 
market boilerplate abuse. She indicates that boilerplate deletion of key consumer 
rights renders the product defective because it makes the legal features non-
functional and the merchant immune from liability and insensitive to its clientele’s 
interests. Accordingly, she claims, the overall purchase is less safe for the 
consumer.64 The sections below will address these aspects of Radin’s proposals in 
light of the competing policy considerations.  
A. Tort, Contract and Mass Remedies 
One reason that Radin asserts tort superior to contract is that the former has an 
“infrastructure” for dealing with mass torts “[w]hereas contract law has not 
developed an infrastructure for dealing with mass contracts.”65 Because of her 
general belief in the superiority of collective over individual action in making legal 
challenges, a fair reading of Radin’s book is that she favors class actions wherever 
possible.66 Thus, she spells out how “boilerplate rights deletion schemes” often 
deprive consumers of their “right” and “entitlement” to the legal availability of class 
actions.67 
Her position  is unsupported—no stand-alone substantive right or entitlement 
exists to a class action remedy. As the courts have held, absent a statute or a contract 
term, there is “no right” to bring a class action. In almost all instances, the “right” to 
bring a class action is merely a procedural one that arises from the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.68 
                                                                                                                                          
 64 RADIN, supra note 3, at 198, 211, 222, 248, 253 n.11. 
 65 Id. at 198. 
 66 Radin properly points out that class actions can be an effective method of vindicating 
individual legal rights, especially when the damages in question are small for each class 
member. Id. at 134, 290. While she believes that defendants gain a “financial advantage” 
when courts disallow “aggregative procedures,” she gives little or no weight to the potentially 
coercive nature of some class action suits. Id. at 133-34. In contrast to Radin, numerous courts 
point out the potential “downside” of class actions. See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting these “downsides”); CE Design Ltd. v. 
King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Certification as a class 
action can coerce a defendant into settling on highly disadvantageous terms regardless of the 
merits of the suit.”) (citing decisions) (also citing the 1998 Advisory Committee Notes to FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(f) for the proposition that “[A]n order granting certification . . . may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of 
potentially ruinous liability.”). Radin’s book would have been improved had she made a more 
balanced presentation on the legitimate rights and interests of merchants regarding class 
actions.  
 67 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 3, at 85; see also id. at 101 (arguing against contract 
clauses that involve “relinquishing one’s right to bring a class action in court”); id. at 130 
(arguing for a “right to aggregative remedies”) (either class actions or class wide arbitration); 
id. at 173 (mass market contracts that exclude class actions use private tools to dispose of a 
public “right” of redress).  
 68 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2010) (“[A] party 
may not be compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to class arbitration unless 
there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”); AutoNation USA 
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The next response, one that Radin herself admits, is that if a plaintiff successfully 
challenges a class action waiver, then courts in contract cases do indeed have a 
“[p]rocedure for addressing the social effect of a [rights deletion scheme.]” 69 Radin 
does not reconcile this inconsistency and does not mention contract has an ideal 
infrastructure for dealing with mass contracts. 
To this end, courts have frequently certified class actions involving consumer 
claims on form contracts.70 Thus, in Sacred Heart Health Systems, Inc. v. Humana 
Military Healthcare,71 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
observed that “[i]t is the form contract, executed under like conditions by all class 
members, that best facilitates class treatment.” This case supports the argument that 
contract is actually superior to tort to support class actions because the facts giving 
rise to liability will be more manageable with boilerplate contracts than in mass tort 
cases.72 Moreover in Dupler v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,73 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York collected cases for the proposition that 
class certification is typically appropriate in cases involving form contracts.  
These cases remain good law in their respective jurisdictions.  Because standard 
form contracts are usually more adaptable than mass torts in accommodating 
                                                                                                                                          
Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App. 2003) (enforcing arbitration clause which 
prohibited class-action claims, stating that “there is no entitlement to proceed as a class 
action”); accord Blaz v. Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Johnson v. W. 
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2000): 
Though the statute [the Truth in Lending Act] clearly contemplates class actions, there 
are no provisions within the law that create a right to bring them, or evince an intent 
by Congress that claims initiated as class actions be exempt from binding arbitration 
clauses. The “right” to proceed to a class action . . . is a procedural one that arises 
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
  Courts frequently state that the use of class action procedures is not a substantive right. 
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank 
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23 is 
a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”). 
 69 RADIN, supra note 3, at 182. One pair of commentators cogently observes that 
“[t]echnically, provisions addressing class relief are class arbitration waivers, not class action 
waivers.” Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The 
Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 965 (2014). 
Radin uses the similar description “relinquishing one’s right to bring a class action in court.” 
RADIN, supra note 3, at 101. Because many cases and a number of commentators use the 
terminology “class action waivers,” id., this Article will do the same. 
 70 Infra notes 71-73. 
 71 601 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2010), analyzed in Martin H. Drake, Comment, Sacred 
Heart Health Systems v. Humana Military Healthcare Services: May Plaintiffs Be Properly 
Certified As a Class Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) In the Absence Of a Standard Form Contract?, 
34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 669 (2011).  
 72 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:74 (5th ed. 2013). 
 73 249 F.R.D. 29, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 3:24 (5th ed. 2013) (same).  
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collective lawsuits, Radin’s failure to mention this aspect of mass contracts is a 
material omission in her thesis.  
B.  The Divide Between Tort and Contract 
1. Is There A Clear Border? 
General theories of tort law are an awkward method to remedy a contract dispute 
and Radin errs in suggesting otherwise.  In a prominent example of her doctrinal 
analysis, Radin states that the borderline between contracts and torts “has always 
been malleable, because the legal categories overlap, and their contours have 
evolved as the need for them shifted over time.”74 She also argues that history, 
theory, and practice “demonstrate the lack of a clear cut boundary between contracts 
and torts.”75 She even offers the undocumented opinion that “very few [persons] 
suppose that contract doctrines can be gathered up into a deductive and logical 
unified system.”76 In this manner, Radin’s Chapter Eleven—entitled 
“Reconceptualizing (Some) Boilerplate under Tort Law”—makes her case for new 
non-contractual remedies to combat boilerplate divestments of core consumer rights. 
My first response is that Radin overstates the malleable or shifting nature of the 
general borderline between tort and contract causes of action.77 True enough, some 
cases have used colorful language to this effect, but such words are commonly taken 
out of context.78 Under the decisions, the borderline is uncertain primarily in that 
parties to a contract may not sue each other in tort absent a violation of an 
“independent duty” in tort.79 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has observed, 
                                                                                                                                          
 74 RADIN, supra note 3, at 199; see also id. at 199, 201 (doctrines “overlap or are 
interlocking”).   
 75 Id. at 199. 
 76 Id. at 201. To the contrary, Judge Richard Posner has said that both contract and tort 
reflect a “logical system of law.” Richard Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 326, 328 (1988). The former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court has said more forcefully that “[c]ontract is perhaps the most concrete and predictable 
body of legal doctrine.” See infra note 193 and accompanying text.  
 77 One of several questionable arguments on this point is her contention regarding the 
basis of promissory estoppel. Radin argues that the original Restatement of Contracts applied 
a contract (promissory) basis whereas the current Restatement (Second) of Contracts applies a 
tort (reliance) basis. RADIN, supra note 3, at 200-01. Taking a different view, Professors 
Edward Yorio and Steve Thel have shown in exhaustive detail the promissory basis of the 
current Restatement. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 
101 YALE L.J. 111, 111 (1991) (“This Article shows that the prominence of reliance in the text 
of Section 90 and in the commentary on the section does not correspond to what courts do in 
fact. Judges actually enforce promises rather than protect reliance in Section 90 cases.”). But 
see Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” On Promissory Estoppel: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. Rev. 580 (1998) (disputing Yorio and Thel’s 
thesis).  
 78 See Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 79 Id. at 16. 
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Between actions plainly ex contractu and those as clearly ex delicto there 
exists what has been termed a border-land, where the lines of distinction 
are shadowy and obscure, and the tort and the contract so approach each 
other, and become so nearly coincident as to make their practical 
separation somewhat difficult.... [Commentators have described a tort] in 
general as “a wrong independent of contract.” And yet, it is conceded that 
a tort may grow out of, or make part of, or be coincident with a contract, 
and that precisely the same state of facts, between the same parties, may 
admit of an action either ex contractu or ex delicto. In such cases the tort 
is dependent upon, while at the same time independent of the contract; for 
if the latter imposes a legal duty upon a person, the neglect of that duty 
may constitute a tort founded upon a contract.80 
Based on the foregoing decisions, the better view regarding the overlap between 
contract and tort causes of action is that courts generally allow a tort claim if an 
independent tort arises out of a contractual relationship, typically fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negligence in a 
personal injury case.81  In special situations where the tort exists on facts separate 
from the contract, the law preserves the distinction between tort and contract but 
does not bar a valid tort complaint just because it arose in a contractual setting.82 In 
other words, the cases that distinguish tort claims from contract claims consider the 
gravamen or gist of the cause of action, described in the section below.83 
The above explanation further addresses Radin’s comment about the relation of 
tort and contract in areas such as attorney malpractice where she says “malpracticing 
. . . attorneys are frequently held liable in tort to clients with whom they have 
contracts.”84 The actual state of the law on this topic, however, is more nuanced than 
Radin’s broad generalization. Under the decisions, “[w]here an act of an attorney 
complained of is a breach of the specific terms of an attorney-client contract, the 
action is in contract, but where the gravamen of the action is a breach of a legal duty, 
the action is in tort.”85 Thus, it can be seen that even in Radin’s attorney malpractice 
example proffered as showing the overlapping of tort and contract, courts actually 
apply the gravamen or gist of the cause of action in selecting between these two 
                                                                                                                                          
 80 Id. (quoting Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882)).  
 81 Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis of 
Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390, 408 (1997) (noting tort actions permit recovery of 
emotional distress and punitive damages; extensive comparison of tort and contract remedies). 
Professor Farnsworth notes several other intersections of tort and contract, but none support 
Radin’s thesis that a consumer can convert a contract claim into a tort claim. For example, he 
notes that “[t]here has been an enhanced recognition of reliance on a promise as a basis for 
legal rights.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.6 at 26 (3d ed. 2004). 
 82 See Solid Gold Jewelers v. ADT Sec. Sys., 600 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960 (N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(tort liability exists only where a party breaches a duty which he owes to another that exists 
independently of the contract, i.e., a duty that exists even without a contract). 
 83 See infra Section III.C. 
 84 RADIN, supra note 3, at 209. 
 85 1A C.J.S. Actions § 150 (2013). 
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theories of liability. This technique is the traditional method for separating tort and 
contract and identifying the basis of the cause of action.86 
The second instance where the contract-tort border is sometimes said to be 
“blurred” is where courts apply the “economic loss” doctrine.87 Radin oversimplifies 
the definition of the doctrine when she states it “[o]perates to limit tort remedies in 
negligence actions” and “[p]recludes relief in [tort] actions for consequential losses 
that are merely economic.”88 More fully defined, the economic loss doctrine is a 
judicial creation that prohibits purchasers of products from recovering purely 
economic damages under negligence or products liability theories. The rationale is 
that, absent personal injuries or property damage, a defective product has not 
performed as expected. For this reason, claims for damage to the product itself are 
best understood as a U.C.C. warranty claim rather than a tort claim.89 Therefore, 
courts rule that contract, which traditionally protects expectation interests, and not 
tort, should govern the buyer’s remedy in this setting.90  
Radin leaves out that the economic loss doctrine helps safeguard the “historical 
distinction” between tort and contract.91 In this way, the criteria for applying the 
economic loss doctrine rely upon the “traditional differences” between tortious and 
contractual liability. Courts have observed, “[the] purpose of the economic loss 
doctrine . . . is ‘maintaining the separate spheres of the law of contract and tort.’”92 
Accordingly, the economic loss doctrine “provides a rule that is straightforward and 
predictable and that establishes a logical demarcation between cases properly 
pursued as tort actions and those which are warranty claims.”93 Along similar lines, 
                                                                                                                                          
 86 See infra Section III.C. The same general test applies to medical malpractice, 61 AM. 
JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 286 (2013), and accountant malpractice, 1 AM. JUR. 2D 
Accountants § 21 (2013), which categories Radin identifies in a very general way as 
supporting her thesis. RADIN, supra note 3, at 209, 297 n.1, 299 n.17. 
 87 Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (D.S.C. 
1993), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1125 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 88 RADIN, supra note 3, at 214 (also arguing the economic loss doctrine should not protect 
World B contracts). 
 89 Myrtle Beach, 843 F. Supp. at 1049. “Remedies for breach of warranty ‘sufficiently 
protect[ ] the purchaser by allowing it to obtain the benefit of its bargain,’ and thus place the 
purchaser in the same position it would have been in had the product functioned properly.” Id. 
(quoting E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)); see 
also Peterson Grp., Inc. v. PLTQ Lotus Grp., L.P., 417 S.W.3d 46, 62 (Tex. App. 2013) 
(“When injury is only economic loss to subject [] of contract itself, [] action sounds in contract 
alone.”). 
 90 Myrtle Beach, 843 F. Supp. at 1053-54; Hansen v. Liberty Partners, LLC, 2005 WL 
3527162, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 2005). “Economic loss” is loss of a bargained-for 
product based on a commercial transaction versus loss resulting from physical injury to person 
or other property because of negligence or strict liability. Myrtle Beach, 843 F. Supp. at 1050. 
 91 Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848, 851 
(6th Cir. 2002). Cf. RADIN, supra note 3, at 214-16. 
 92 N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (emphasis added). 
 93 David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1110 (Kan. 2011) (citing Koss Constr. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
960 P.2d 255 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)); see also Zimmerman v. Logemann, 2009 WL 4407205, 
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the rule provides a “bright line rule of damage to a proprietary interest” where it is 
only those “cases at its edge” that can cause analytical difficulty.94 
Radin argues that the economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to her new tort of 
intentional deprivation of basic legal rights. While Radin contends that the 
deployment of harmful boilerplate is an intentional wrong and that the economic loss 
rule is inapplicable to intentional torts,95 the truth is that courts have split on whether 
the economic loss rule applies to intentional torts.96 Radin further argues the 
economic loss doctrine does not control her new tort because the loss to the recipient 
is fully compensable for both an economic and non-economic loss, such as where the 
consumer also loses the benefit of the right to a jury trial.97 The problem with 
Radin’s second argument is that a consumer would merely need to allege a non-
economic harm accompanying the economic harm and thereby easily circumvent 
this important method for keeping tort and contract confined to their separate 
spheres.98  
2. The Implied Warranty of Habitability as Case Study 
In further developing her theory of interlocking categories between tort and 
contract, Radin’s most prominent example is her “case study” of the implied 
warranty of habitability in residential leases.99 As it turns out, however, the cases, for 
the most part, rebut rather than support her thesis.  
The common law was originally very harsh on tenants, holding that as a general 
rule, because a lease was a conveyance, the landlord was exculpated and owed no 
duty to the tenant or to the tenant’s guests even for dangerous or defective conditions 
on the premises.100 Radin recites that courts first began modifying this rule by 
                                                                                                                                          
at *7 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2009) (general idea behind the doctrine is “straightforward and 
uncontroversial”). But see Aliki Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 159, 
164 (D. Conn. 2010) (“While simply stated, the doctrine and relevant case law can be 
confusing.”). 
 94 State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 95 RADIN, supra note 3, at 215-16. 
 96 First Republic Bank v. Brand, 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 329 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2000) (summarizing 
cases); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 613 n.1 (2d ed. 2013) (“Even 
some intentional torts may be protected by the economic loss rule in some instances.”).   
 97 RADIN, supra note 3, at 216. 
 98 See also Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic 
Loss from Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2008) (“[W]hen the defective 
product causes economic, non-economic damages, or both, the economic loss doctrine comes 
into application.”). 
 99 Although Radin gives the impression that the courts universally accept the implied 
common law warranty, see RADIN, supra note 3, at 204-06, a significant minority of 
jurisdictions reject this doctrine. See 25 MARK S. DENNISON, CAUSES OF ACTION § 3 (2d ed. 
2004 & Supp. 2013) (citing cases from Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Wyoming). This subsection assumes that the lease 
at issue has no express clause covering a warranty of habitability.  
 100 Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 202 (Wyo. 1995).  
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 181 
 
reading into leases an implied warranty of habitability based on housing codes.101 
The injured tenant’s remedy was that his promise to pay rent became dependent 
upon the landlord’s implied promise to deliver habitable premises.102 At a later time, 
it became clear that the warranty did not necessarily track the codes in detail and so 
in various (but not all) jurisdictions the implied warranty became effective by 
statute.103  
She then notes that courts further developed the implied warranty through 
specific standards of habitability and formulas for tenant relief. For example, under a 
commonly-used rent abatement formula, courts may reduce the tenant’s rental 
obligation commensurate with the percentage downgrade of habitability.104 Noting 
that the Restatement (Second) of Property adopts this formula, Radin avers, “[c]ourts 
often speak of this [approach] as a contractual remedy, but it is actually a hybrid 
between contract and tort, with emphasis on the tort side.”105 Radin draws this 
conclusion because she believes courts in this circumstance are not necessarily 
enforcing a contract. Her rationale is the reduction in rent is compensation to the 
tenant akin to a tort remedy because the landlord has “wronged” him by putting a 
substandard unit on the market.106 
Radin cites no authority for her argument that courts in this situation are 
essentially compensating the tenant in tort for the landlord’s wrong. It turns out, 
however, that there are indeed two schools of thought on whether this implied 
warranty of habitability sounds in contract or in tort.  
Most decisions follow the rule of keeping tort and contract remedies separate 
(and the tort here usually refers to the tenant’s personal injury or property damage 
resulting from defective premises).107 This line of cases says “[a] residential 
landlord’s warranty of habitability is a contract duty, not a duty grounded in tort.”108 
This view is correct because it recognizes that “a lease is essentially a contract 
between the landlord and the tenant wherein the landlord promises to deliver and 
maintain the demised premises in habitable condition and the tenant promises to pay 
rent.”109  
                                                                                                                                          
 101 RADIN, supra note 3, at 206. 
 102 Id. 
 103 RADIN, supra note 3, at 205. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 205 & n.26 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT § 
11.1 (1977)). 
 106 Id. at 205-06. 
 107 RADIN, supra note 3, at 206. 
 108 E.g., Steward ex rel. Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Va. 
2012); Weiler v. Hooshiari, 19 A.3d 124, 128 (Vt. 2011). The Uniform Residential Landlord 
and Tenant Act’s cause of action for damages ensures that the premises are habitable and does 
not create a tort action for damages which did not previously exist. Tighe v. Cedar Lawn, Inc., 
649 N.W.2d 520, 527 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002) (construing NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419 (2014)). 
 109 Weiler, 19 A.3d at 126; McIntyre v. Phila. Hous. Authority, 816 A.2d 1204, 1208-09 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). The Weiler court also stated:  
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The following statement from the Wisconsin Supreme Court captures one aspect 
of why tort law is the wrong fit for the implied warranty: 
A tenant’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability is a 
breach of contract claim for contractual damages. An injured party’s’ 
claim for personal injuries is a tort claim in negligence for compensatory 
damages. Such claims may coexist, they may be caused by the same act, 
and they may be owned by the same party if it is the tenant who was 
injured. It is not the breach of warranty, however, that gives rise to the 
cause of action for the personal injury. Instead, it is the negligent act or 
omission.110 
Further, a Virginia case cautions that a landlord’s breach of contract is not a tort: 
Such injuries resulting not directly from a breach of the contract, but from 
physical conditions existing apart from the contract, which the contract 
merely undertook to eliminate, cannot well be regarded as a proximate 
result of the breach of the contract, within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of the making thereof. To allow a recovery for such injuries is 
to allow a recovery as for tort on account of a breach of contract.111  
Because of these doctrinal barriers against tort, the majority view is that 
“[d]amages for personal injuries [are] not allowed for breach of implied warranty of 
habitability unless accompanied by tortious conduct.”112 Once again, courts are 
merely applying the independent tort/gist of the action doctrine (see Section III). 
Therefore, plaintiffs incurring personal injury or property damage from a condition 
on the premises frequently will assert in the alternative that breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability proves negligence or negligence per se stemming from the 
landlord’s breach of a common law or statutory duty to keep the leased property free 
of hazards.113 
                                                                                                                                          
Leases are contracts, and damages for breach generally turn on the respective 
promises of the parties and are limited to recovery of the benefit of the bargain. 
Claims for personal injury or property damage sound in tort, typically in an action for 
negligent breach of a duty of care, and depend on comparative degrees of fault. [T]he 
habitability warranty is a creature of contract . . . (emphasis added). 
 
Id. 
 110 Antwaun A. ex rel. Muwonge v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 456, 469 (Wis. 
1999). 
 111 Caudill v. Gibson Fuel Co., Inc., 38 S.E.2d 465, 469-70 (Va. 1946), approved in 
Steward ex rel. Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Va. 2012) (also 
noting an exception for where the landlord was guilty of fraud or concealment). Elsewise, 
Wyoming properly puts the emphasis on whether a duty should be recognized to support a 
new tort. Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 206 n.3 (Wyo. 1995) (“Factors to consider in 
imposing a duty on a landlord include weighing the relationship of the parties against the 
nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution, as well as the likelihood of 
injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing 
that burden on a defendant.”). 
 112 25 MARK S. DENNISON, CAUSES OF ACTION § 31 (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2013). 
 113 Id. at § 15 and cases cited therein. 
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The final reason Radin uses to support her ‘tort over contract’ interpretation of 
the implied warranty is that the rent abatement remedy compensates for the 
diminution in rent for the corresponding shortfall in habitability.114 Her argument is 
not persuasive because a leading California appellate case cited this same diminution 
in rent formula in an implied warranty of habitability case. In that decision, the court 
repeatedly stated that the plaintiff was pursuing a contractual remedy.115 Further, 
none of the policies for granting tort damages apply to the remedy of rental 
abatement. Here, the court is simply giving the injured party the reduced value of the 
benefit of the bargain. If the action were truly in tort, the plaintiff would be restored 
to its former position, but instead the court is awarding a sum that is the equivalent 
of performance of the bargain—the objective to put the tenant in the position he 
would be in if the contract had been properly performed.116 Thus, the rental 
abatement formula protects the tenant’s expectation interest in contract versus the 
restoration interest in tort by compensating the tenant for the lost value of the 
leasehold.117 
As stated above, a second line of decisions (uncited by Radin) provides that the 
implied warranty “[a]llows recovery not only under contract law but also tort 
law.”118 On their surface, these decisions support Radin’s argument that the implied 
warranty partakes of both contract and tort. Therefore, Radin might contend that the 
implied warranty of habitability does properly subject the landlord to possible tort 
liability for a dangerous condition that caused either property damage or personal 
injuries to tenants or their guests.119  
These cases, conflicting with the weight of authority, are not persuasive. The 
reason is they misapprehend that contract terms do not create sources of duties in tort 
and a breach of contract ordinarily is distinct from a tort.120  
                                                                                                                                          
 114 RADIN, supra note 3, at 206. 
 115 Cazares v. Ortiz, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108, 112 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1980) (noting that 
tenant in the case did not plead a cause of action in tort). 
 116 Rathke v. Roberts, 207 P.2d 716, 720-21 (Wash. 1949). 
 117 See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972) (“For the balance of the term, 
tenant has lost the benefit of his bargain, assuming he had an advantageous lease.”). 
 118 Sample v. Haga, 824 So. 2d 627, 631 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Humber v. Morton, 426 
S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. 1968) (suggesting that breach of the implied warranty of habitability, 
from which the warranty of suitability is derived, is an action in tort rather than in contract); 
see also Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009) (“[I]mplied warranty of 
habitability . . . is a multi-faceted legal concept that encompasses contract and tort 
principles.”). 
 119 Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1005. 
 120 See Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 306 P.3d 197, 200 (Idaho 2013) (“The source of a 
tort duty simply does not arise from the duty of contractual performance.”) (also stating that 
“[o]rdinarily, breach of contract is not a tort.”); see also DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433, 435–36 (Utah 1983) (explaining that tort and contractual duties are distinct and that 
tort liability does not necessarily follow directly from a contractual breach, although a 
contractual relationship may give rise to a relationship on which a tort duty is premised); 
Harrell v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tenn.1996) (“[T]here is a 
fundamental flaw in analyzing insurance contract terms under tort principles.”). 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014
184 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:163 
This tort theory of the implied warranty further overlooks basic principles 
governing tort and contract damages. Leases are contracts and determining damages 
for breach of contract generally depend on the parties’ promises and the injured 
party’s expectation interest as limited by the benefit of the bargain. Tenant claims 
against landlords for their negligently maintained premises causing personal injury 
or property damage are independent tort claims and (usually) depend on comparative 
degrees of fault.121 Thus, the Wyoming Supreme Court got it right when it indicated 
in applying the implied warranty of habitability that those courts imposing a duty in 
tort outside the independent duty rule have done so less on legal principles and more 
on “social policy” to improve tenant living conditions.122 Therefore, in contrast with 
Radin’s analysis, the better-reasoned cases on the implied warranty of habitability 
exemplify how tort and contract do not overlap. 
3. Other Principles Demonstrating a Clear Boundary 
The analysis in this section thus far addresses Radin’s theories that she says 
support her proposed tort “takeover” of contract. Throughout her Chapter Eleven on 
the suggested expansion of tort liability for merchants, Radin does not cite numerous 
legal doctrines that support the “fundamental distinction between tort and 
contract”123 and their “divergent” policy objectives.124 Accordingly, the law 
counteracts the danger that contract law could “swallow” tort law125 just as the law 
equally protects contract from drowning in a “sea of tort.”126 Radin only briefly 
adverts to this doctrine, mostly in one footnote.127 
This section of the Article will cite those same uncited doctrines that prove how 
highly courts value a strong contract-tort boundary. 
According to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, contract and tort are two “wholly 
distinct and separate” fields of law wherein contract liability is “completely 
irrelevant” to tort liability.128 The reasons for the gulf between the two fields arise 
from the substantive differences between tort and contract. Tort actions stem from 
the breach of duties imposed by law as a matter of public policy whereas contract 
actions derive from the breach of duties imposed by mutual consent.129 Another way 
                                                                                                                                          
 121 See Weiler v. Hooshiari, 19 A.3d 124, 128 (Vt. 2011). 
 122 Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo. 1995). 
 123 Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 242 (Wis. 2004).  
 124 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988); see also Ashall Homes 
Ltd. v. ROK Entm’t Grp. Inc., 992 A.2d 1239, 1253 (Del. Ch. 2010); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 
578 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (similar comments). 
 125 Deli, 578 N.W.2d at 782. 
 126 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986); La Pesca 
Grande Charters, Inc. v. Moran, 704 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 127 RADIN, supra note 3, at 297 n.1. 
 128 De Ark v. Nashville Stone Setting Corp., 279 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955). 
 129 E.g., Goldstein v. Elk Lighting, Inc., 2013 WL 790765, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013); 
Foley, 765 P.2d at 389; Town of Alma v. Azco Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000). 
Radin does mention this point, see RADIN, supra note 3, at 201, 209, but also claims it is 
“simplistic” and in need of modification. 
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of looking at the same issue is that tort law focuses on the relationship between 
society and the individual, which coverage is potentially extremely wide-ranging, 
whereas contract is concerned with the relationship between specific parties 
voluntarily entering a transaction, which coverage is always much narrower.130 A 
related distinction is that with contract, courts intervene primarily to enforce the 
contractual benefit of the bargain or to give meaning to the contract terms once a 
dispute develops.131  
In another instance where Radin barely acknowledges the tort-contract divide, 
settled doctrine132 provides that, as a matter of policy, the law disallows parties from 
using tort law to alter or avoid their contractual obligations.133 The preceding section 
on the implied warranty of habitability nicely illustrates this point. Further, courts 
agree that a “contractual obligation, by itself, does not create a tort duty” 134 because 
“all contract duties and breaches of those duties . . . must be enforced pursuant to 
contract law.”135 Courts also reason that “[p]ermitting parties to sue in tort when the 
deal goes awry rewrites the agreement by allowing a party to recoup a benefit 
[primarily higher damages] that was not part of the bargain.”136  
                                                                                                                                          
 130 See Foley, 765 P.2d at 389; Azco Const., 10 P.3d at 1262. 
 131 Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 968–69 (E.D. Wis.1999); 
Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cnty. Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 451-52 (Wis. 1999) (“In contract 
law, the parties’ duties arise from the terms of their particular agreement; the goal is to hold 
parties to that agreement so that each receives the benefit of his or her bargain.”). 
 132 RADIN, supra note 3, at 209 (noting that the “presence of a contract . . . excludes 
application of tort law with respect to claims of one of the parties.”). 
 133 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 712 (2008) (“As a general matter of policy, tort law 
should not be used to alter or avoid a bargain made in a contract.”); see also In re Consol. 
Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 893 P.2d 438, 446 (N.M. 1995) (same). 
 134 Jones v. Hyatt Ins. Agency, Inc., 741 A.2d 1099, 1107 (Md. 1999); see also Silk v. Flat 
Top Constr., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 356, 360 (W. Va. 1994) (“Tort law is not designed . . . to 
compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties assumed only by 
agreement.”) (quoting City of Richmond v. Madison Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 
1990)). (“[T]he controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is the 
protection of expectations bargained for.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neal, Architects, Inc. 374 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1988)). By 
contrast, if the “tort” action is actually for breach of contract, the action in tort will not lie. 
E.g., Tiffin Motorhomes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 698 (Ct. App.2011). 
 135 Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 617-18 (Tex. 1986) (“When the 
injury is only the economic loss that is the subject of a contract, the action sounds in contract 
alone.” (citing Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry Cnty. Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 
312 (Tex. 1978))); see also Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003) 
(“Tort law should govern the duties and liabilities imposed by legislatures and courts upon 
non-consenting members of society, and contract law should govern the bargained-for duties 
and liabilities of persons who exercise freedom of contract.”); accord In re Brooke Corp., 467 
B.R. 492, 501 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012) (“The well-established rule . . . is the existence of a 
contractual relationship bars the assertion of tort claims covering the same subject matter as 
that governed by the contract.”). 
 136 Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 848 (Wis. 1998); see also 
Grynberg, 70 P.3d at 11(“[P]arties are not permitted to assert actions in tort in an attempt to 
circumvent the bargain they agreed upon.”). 
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The next important tort/contract difference concerns the related issue of plaintiff 
compensation. “A bright line distinction between the remedies offered in contract 
and tort with respect to economic damages . . .  encourages parties to negotiate 
toward the risk distribution that is desired or customary.”137  In light of this 
distinction, the law more generously compensates a prevailing tort claimant for all 
damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor and further permits recovery (as 
justified) of emotional distress damages and punitive damages.138 The compensation 
standard for breach of contract is more stringent; the defendant will be liable for 
economic loss damages only when they were reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
contract formation, and likely to result.139 Punitive damages and emotional distress 
damages are much less available in contract than in tort.140 The tort “proximately 
caused” standard is more generous than the contract “likely to result” doctrine.141 
Therefore, courts are cognizant that they must not permit an aggrieved party to select 
tort over contract and thereby recover an undeserved benefit—the greater monetary 
relief allowed in tort—outside the terms of the contract.142 
Radin does not cite the principles in the preceding section and further omits 
several other guiding philosophies regarding tort and contract. First, courts consider 
that “predictability about the cost of contractual relationships plays an important role 
in our commercial system.” Second, “[c]ourts traditionally have awarded damages 
for breach of contract to compensate the aggrieved party rather than to punish the 
                                                                                                                                          
 137 Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007) (quoting Berschauer/Phillips Constr. 
Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (Wash. 1994)). 
 138 Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 250 (Colo. 2003) (Bender, J., 
concurring). 
 139 Id. at 249; 24 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:7 (4th ed. 2002). 
 140 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 590 (2013) (“As a general rule, courts hold that punitive 
damages are not available as a remedy for breach of contract, without an underlying tort.”); 
LORD, supra note 139 (“Mental suffering caused by a breach of contract, although it may be a 
real injury, is not generally considered as a basis for compensation in contractual actions.”) 
(also noting some qualifications). To her credit, Radin specifically mentions these differences. 
RADIN, supra note 3, at 206 (emotional distress damages); Id. at 147, 206, 221 (punitive 
damages). 
 141 See RADIN, supra note 3, at 297 n.1. 
 142 Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 847-48 (Wis. 1998). 
Radin’s proposed compensation for the consumer is statutory damages and attorney fees. 
RADIN, supra note 3, at 213, 244. She also proposes that “[a] remedy should apply to everyone 
who was a recipient of a particular offending set of boilerplate.” Id. at 212. Given that Radin 
advocates statutory damages, and likely on a class action basis, she appears to concede that the 
measurable harm to a particular consumer could be minimal or even non-existent with most 
adhesive contracts. See also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1060 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing cases suggesting that in general “statutory damages do not 
require proof of injury”). At the same time, statutory liquidated damages are remedial and not 
punitive and so it is not clear how Radin could meet this policy if the damage is nominal to 
individual plaintiffs. Cf. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hiar Holding, L.L.C., 411 S.W.3d 258, 268 
(Mo. 2013) (statutory damages are remedial and not a penalty for public wrongs). Radin’s 
strong implication is that a class action in tort should punish and deter merchants using 
improper boilerplate. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 216 (noting that her tort regime is designed 
to “deter the worst instances of boilerplate overreaching”). 
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breaching party.”143 These two principles override Radin’s new tort remedies and 
counsel restricting the consumer to its contract remedies.  
The reason is that Radin inappropriately assigns moral blame for the merchant’s 
supposed contractual wrongs when the law is clear that “contract law is, in its 
essential design, a law of strict liability, and the accompanying system of remedies 
operates without regard to fault.” 144 By contrast, tort law does consider the issue of 
moral blame: “[o]ne factor affecting the development of tort law is the moral aspect 
of the defendant’s conduct-the moral guilt or blame to be attached in the eyes of 
society to the defendant’s acts, motives, and state of mind.”145 Radin’s proposal 
therefore is unwarranted because it clouds the predictability of contract relationships 
and unduly merges the function of tort and contract as her tort-based approach 
primarily expresses moral disapproval of the merchant’s ethically and legally-
permissible use of mass market boilerplate.  
In her advocacy of tort over contract, Radin concludes unpersuasively that 
“[t]here is nothing especially odd or radical about the proposal I . . .  offer.”146 In 
actuality, her suggestion dangerously undermines the goal that contracting parties 
must be confident that they will not face the possibility of unintended liability 
outside their bargain and beyond the cost considerations each side built into the 
perceived contract risks.147 Accordingly, Radin’s advocacy for a tort “takeover”148 of 
abusive boilerplate is not a valid legal reform but is instead a mere social 
engineering policy preference aiding consumers over merchants.  
C. Techniques For Separating Contract And Tort 
As indicated above, the classification of an injured party’s remedial theory of 
damages is a major technique the law uses to keep tort and contract separate. One 
principal way the law uses to accomplish this goal is that where the same transaction 
constitutes a breach of contract, express or implied, and a tort, the plaintiff may 
waive the tort and maintain an action in contract.149 The law follows still other 
safeguards to prevent the undue merger of tort and contract. 
                                                                                                                                          
 143 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988).  
 144 In re Borges, 485 B.R. 743, 772 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2012) (citing 3 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 190 (1990)); see also supra note 60 and 
accompanying text (use of boilerplate is not morally offensive). 
 145 Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 278, 281 n.14 (Mich. 1996). 
 146 RADIN, supra note 3, at 203. 
 147 See Town of Alma v. AZCO Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) 
Limiting the availability of tort remedies in these situations holds parties to the terms 
of their bargain. In this way, the law serves to encourage parties to confidently 
allocate risks and costs during their bargaining without fear that unanticipated liability 
may arise in the future, effectively negating the parties’ efforts to build these cost 
considerations into the contract.  
Id. 
 148 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 149 1A C.J.S. Actions § 160 (2013); see also id. at § 170 (party may waive tort of fraud and 
sue in contract for breach). 
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Primarily, Radin never mentions the established line of authority that the gist or 
gravamen of the cause of action is determinative for deciding whether the action lies 
in contract or tort.150 In deciding whether a contract claim is “masquerading as a 
tort,” this test considers whether the “parties’ obligations are defined by the terms of 
the contract [or] by the larger social policies embodied by the law of torts.”151 Stated 
another way, the prevailing test for enforcing tort liability when the parties have a 
contract is whether the wrongdoer also breaches an independent duty to the injured 
party owed separately from the contract.152 Thus, where the defendant has damaged 
the person or property of the plaintiff, but where these parties also have a contract, 
the contract under many decisions must be collateral to the complained-of activity to 
support tort liability.153  
With Radin’s proposed cause of action in tort for improper boilerplate, the 
contract is not collateral. Under her theory, Radin overlooks that the proposed tort 
liability arises solely from the contractual relationship between the parties and the 
alleged duties breached are all grounded in the contract itself.154 By leaving out this 
important restraint, Radin continues to present an incomplete picture of the wisdom 
and feasibility of transforming a matter of contract into one of tort.  
Furthermore, Radin’s proposal to provide relief in tort as redress for what is 
solely a controversy in contract adds undue complexity and confusion to the 
administration of civil remedies. As a leading treatise announces, the law should 
reduce the dual availability of tort and contract remedies for the same loss so that the 
rules will be simplified and a reduction will occur in litigation costs.155 In those rare 
instances where the courts expand common law tort liability, they prefer broadening 
an existing tort rather than creating a new cause of action.156  By contrast, Radin’s 
                                                                                                                                          
 150 1A C.J.S. Actions § 136 (2013); see also Green v. Moore, 2001 WL 1660828, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“The gravamen of an action is in tort and not in contract, however, 
when an act constituting a contractual breach also constitutes a breach of a common law duty 
independent of the contract.me (citing 86 C.J.S. Torts § 4 (1997)). Some courts apply an even 
stricter test, requiring proof of a separate set of facts from those forming the basis of the 
contract claim for a plaintiff to sue in tort. Dorff, supra note 81, at 407-08. “Other courts have 
applied a looser test, allowing the plaintiff to choose between suing in tort or contract if the 
same set of facts could support either type of claim.” Id. 
 151 Goldstein v. Elk Lighting, Inc., 2013 WL 790765, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013). 
 152 Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996).  
 153 Goldstein, 2013 WL 790765, at *3. More elaborately, the “gist of the action” doctrine 
bars tort claims arising solely from a contract between the parties; (2) where the duties 
allegedly breached were created and grounded in the contract itself; (3) where the liability 
stems from a contract; or (4) where the tort claim essentially duplicates a breach of contract 
claim or the success of which is wholly dependent on the terms of a contract. Id.; Bruno v. 
Bozzuto’s, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 462, 466-67 (M.D. Pa. 2012).  
 154 Goldstein, 2013 WL 790765, at *3-4. 
 155 DAN B. DOBBS, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 92, at 655 (5th ed. 1984).  
 156 See, e.g., Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1983) (“[I]f there are categories of legally protectable interests which are now redressed, 
but inadequately so, the much preferable course is to revise traditional doctrine so as to protect 
the interest which has gone unprotected.”).  
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undue merger of tort and contract remedies “[u]ndermines the goals and basic 
principles of contract law and unacceptably blurs the distinction between contract 
and tort.”157 
Based on the multi-faceted divide between the two legal fields, the state of 
current law could not contradict more Radin’s broad assertion that law can 
accommodate her proposals because the contract/tort border is “malleable,” 
“overlapping” and “shifting.”158 
D.  Existing Alternatives to Creating New Torts 
Certainly, merchant abuses of the imbalance of bargaining power have and will 
occur with adhesion contracts and related instruments. For that reason, this Article 
unreservedly agrees that the law should not support unethical or improper practices 
where inconsistent with legal norms and endorses the common statement that courts 
should examine adhesion contracts “with greater scrutiny.”159  
It is also possible, however, to overstate the incidence of such abuses, poor 
practices, or merchant overreaching. Other writers question certain notions that 
Radin takes as a given, namely the propositions that (1) merchants exploit 
consumers by inserting into standard-form contracts terms that systematically exploit 
buyers and (2) consumers commonly ignore or fail to understand the terms of 
standard form contracts.160  
On the first point, a commentator argues sellers have incentives to avoid the 
exploitation of consumers: 
                                                                                                                                          
 157 See also Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230, 252 (Colo. 2003) 
(Bender, J., concurring) (making similar comment about the relation of Colorado contract and 
tort law). In the related circumstance of breach of contract, the California Supreme Court has 
aptly summarized the reasons for disallowing contract cases to sound in tort: 
[T]he different objectives underlying tort and contract breach; the importance of 
predictability in assuring commercial stability in contractual dealings; the potential for 
converting every contract breach into a tort, with accompanying punitive damage 
recovery, and the preference for legislative action in affording appropriate remedies. 
Id.  
  Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 984 (Cal. 1999). 
 158 RADIN, supra note 3, at 199-201. 
 159 Wilkerson ex rel. Wilkerson v. Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see 
also First Alabama Bank v. First State Ins. Co., Inc., 1988 WL 192452, at *11 (N.D. Ala. 
1988) (adhesion contracts “[h]ave always been subjected to careful judicial scrutiny to avoid 
injury to the public.”); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 
2012) (“A contract of adhesion should receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-
for items to determine if it imposes terms that are oppressive, unconscionable or beyond the 
reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”); Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., 431 
A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Brady v. Dep’t of Pers., 693 
A.2d 466 (N.J. 1997) (“[A] contract of adhesion must at very least be closely scrutinized by 
the court to determine its reasonableness.”). 
 160 Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts For Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
975, 977-79 (2006). 
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[S]ellers who attempt to capture the marginal buyer, who face reputational 
constraints, or who cannot distinguish readers from nonreaders, will face 
competitive pressures inconsistent with efforts to exploit nonreaders. Such 
sellers will be more likely to price terms that allocate risks to buyers and 
to enforce ostensibly oppressive terms only in the face of serious buyer 
misbehavior.161 
While conceding that improper seller practices are always “plausible,” the same 
commentator also notes that “[i]nstances of systematic exploitative behavior are 
difficult to document or to assess. The little empirical evidence that exists suggests 
less obvious seller misbehavior than theory might predict.”162 
On the second point, the commentator states “[t]here are reasons to believe that 
[buyer] ignorance is less pervasive than feared.”163 As he points out, 
Under relatively weak assumptions about competition, sellers have 
incentives to make certain favorable terms salient to consumers, including 
comparisons between terms available from different competitors. 
Consumers who have negative experiences with a seller in one context 
have incentives to publicize their experiences, inducing sellers to avoid 
adverse reputational gossip. The ubiquity of websites (for example, 
eBay’s “Feedback Forum,” eopinions.com, and tripadvisor.com) that 
permit consumers to post evaluations of products and services they have 
received significantly reduces the search costs for other consumers who 
desire to compare quality before making similar purchases. Consumers 
who suffer losses in one context may also translate what they have 
learned to other contexts.164  
 
Notably, Radin does not attempt to rebut these arguments.165  
In a point of particular concern, her apparent plan to implement her proposed tort 
reforms that would overhaul boilerplate contracting in an abrupt and wholesale 
manner comes with insufficient assurances that they could succeed.166 Literally 
construed, Radin’s approach would potentially jeopardize, among many others, the 
enforceability of every major credit card contract, residential real estate contract, 
automobile purchase (or rental) agreement, and consumer bank loan contract. Her 
proposal could also impose tort liability upon the merchant employing legally 
approved techniques with attendant sizable damages in a class action proceeding.167 
                                                                                                                                          
 161 Id. at 977. 
 162 Id. at 978. 
 163 Id. at 977. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Radin cites the article in her book, RADIN, supra note 3, at 307 nn.26-27, but does not 
mention these qualifications. 
 166 Id. at 212-16. 
 167 Radin suggests statutory damages for all eligible persons in the mass market who were 
recipients of the offending boilerplate. Id. at 212-13. By necessary implication, Radin 
advocates class action relief for such persons but there is a caveat. Under FED. R. CIV P. 
23(B)(3)(A), the law disfavors class certification where each class member has suffered 
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A suggestion for a pilot project to reform current contracting approaches would have 
been a much more prudent, incremental way to test her theories.  
While she is correct that boilerplate (just as with any other contracting 
mechanism) where misused can cause unfairness, respected authorities have 
observed that boilerplate “abuses” can be “controlled without altering traditional 
doctrines, provided those doctrines are interpreted flexibly, realistically.”168 Rather 
than implement the case law suggestion that the flexible, creative use of existing 
contract remedies is the soundest means to address possible boilerplate exploitation, 
Radin uses the much blunter, hasty, and overbroad approach of radically overhauling 
existing tort law.  
Radin’s critique has missed an even larger legal trend. While she proposes as 
though it were an original proposition that the legal system should broadly regulate 
mass market boilerplate,169 the law already employs wide-ranging boilerplate 
counter-measures. As a California case observes, the legal system has imposed “a 
proliferation of legal controls” on adhesion contracts.170 In recent years, state and 
federal regulatory agencies have also been more active in imposing controls on 
contracts and contract making in particular situations.171 In a similar vein, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts observes that “The obvious danger of 
overreaching has resulted in government regulation of insurance policies, bills of 
lading, retail installment sales, small loans, and other particular types of contracts. 
Regulation sometimes includes administrative review of standard terms, or even 
prescription of terms.”172  
                                                                                                                                          
sizeable damages or has an emotional stake in the litigation but the opposite is true where each 
class member suffered relatively modest damages. See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon 
Shield, Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds, 
Valentino v. Carter–Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the law takes a case-
by-case approach to class certification whereas Radin seems to take an undifferentiated 
approach on the same issue. 
 168 Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). 
 169 RADIN, supra note 3, at 217-21 (calling current efforts “piecemeal”). 
 170 H.S. Perlin Co. v. Morse Signal Devices, 258 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 n.10 (Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 171 Id.; see also F.T.C. v. IFC Credit Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 925, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(stating Federal Trade Commission’s general policy is to rely on consumer choice without 
regulatory intervention except where certain types of unfair sales techniques impair the 
consumer’s ability of free decision making). Pursuant to the Dodd Frank Act, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau has broad power to regulate unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices as well as abusive consumer credit contracts. Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in 
Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L., 107, 107-09 (2012). But 
see Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets 
the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 620 (1990) (“It is axiomatic that government 
involvement in the marketplace is a second best solution. All governmental regulation of 
contracts imposes costs and risks of inefficiency and error and can only be justified when the 
gains from a regulation exceed its costs.”). 
 172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 cmt. c (1981). The following excerpt 
from Alabama law shows the close regulation of terms in insurance policies:  
An insurer may not enter into or issue a policy of insurance under this chapter until its 
policy form has been submitted to and approved by the director of the division of 
insurance. The director of the division of insurance may not approve the policy form 
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In view of these well-known trends, along with the numerous pro-consumer case 
law doctrines cited in this Article, it remains a puzzlement why Radin believes new 
tort remedies are needed or why she insists that the legal system has mounted such 
an ineffectual response to the potential problems of mass market boilerplate 
contracting. 
IV. THE PROPOSED TORT OF INTENTIONAL DEPRIVATION OF BASIC LEGAL RIGHTS 
The prior section analyzed Radin’s argument that tort is a better fit than contract 
to remedy improper boilerplate. Radin gets more specific as she contends that 
abusive boilerplate terms can serve as a proper basis for the tort of intentional 
deprivation of basic legal rights as a means for combating democratic degradation.173  
In this section, after making some general criticisms of her proposed standard, I 
will analyze Radin’s treatment of the following examples of such purported 
improper deprivations: (1) forum selection clauses that can require consumers at 
possible great expense and inconvenience to bring an action in a distant location; (2) 
contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial along with a substitute of mandatory 
arbitration;174 (3) undue limitations of plaintiff remedies under U.C.C. § 2-719 that 
deprive consumers of the right to adequate redress;175 and (4) denial of the 
consumer’s right to adequate safety where infringed by overly broad exculpatory 
clauses that protect the merchant for its negligence against the consumer.176   
A.  General Criticisms of The Proposed Tort 
Radin’s proposal quickly runs into difficulty based on the mental state needed for 
the tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal rights. The required mental state 
                                                                                                                                          
of an insurance company until the company files with it the certificate of the director 
of the division of insurance showing that the company is authorized to transact the 
business of workers’ compensation insurance in the state. The filing of a policy form 
by an insurance company with the division of workers’ compensation for approval 
constitutes, on the part of the company, a conclusive and unqualified acceptance of the 
provisions of this chapter, and an agreement by it to be bound by them.  
ALA. CODE 1975 § 27-14-10 (2009); see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.025 (2009). 
  Another example of governmental regulation of boilerplate is that new contract clauses 
in federal government contracting having a significant cost or administrative impact on 
contractors must go through the standard notice and comment procedures characteristic of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See 48 C.F.R. subpart 1.5 (stating that such proposed 
regulatory clause “shall” be published in the Federal Register and that policy makers “will 
consider” the views of non-governmental parties or organizations). The cases frequently 
comment that the federal procurement regulatory clauses are “boilerplate.” E.g., Jordan Pond 
Co., LLC v. U.S., 115 Fed. Cl. 623, 628 (2014); Appeal of D.W. Clark, Inc., 1994 WL475837 
(ASBCA, Aug. 26, 1994). 
 173 Radin recognizes that naming the tort in this manner is not entirely logical because if 
the court finds the defendant liable and the court invalidates the boilerplate, the plaintiff is not 
deprived of any rights. RADIN, supra note 3, at 301 n.39; see also id. at Chapter Three 
(Radin’s argument regarding democratic degradation). 
 174 Id. at 16-17, 108, 131-32. 
 175 Id. at 140, 141, 145.  
 176 Id. at xiv, 138-40, 184-85. 
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creates the likelihood of the tort’s having little impact because of proof problems. 
The reason is that “intentional” in the law of torts has an established meaning: “[a]n 
intentional tort is one in which the actor intends to produce the harm that ensues; it is 
not enough that he intends to perform the act.”177 In intentional tort cases, courts are 
sensitive to the “inherent” barriers to proving a tortfeasor’s mindset and so resort 
must be had to the often-contestable nature of the surrounding circumstances of the 
defendant’s conduct.178 
 Radin seems to argue that the mere act of issuing boilerplate contracts is 
sufficient evidence of the requisite bad intent, but this position would be incorrect. 
Radin says—with no supporting evidence—that “[t]hose who draw up and deploy 
boilerplate know exactly what they are doing and are fully aware of its effects and 
indeed intend those effects.”179 Without some level of individualized evidence that 
the person intends to produce the harm, however, Radin’s unqualified conclusion 
that every merchant who deploys abusive boilerplate does so intentionally is based 
only on supposition.  
The next problem pertains to how Radin classifies deprivations of “basic legal 
rights.” In addressing this point, Radin contends that boilerplate terms operate 
improperly when they deprive consumers of rights granted by the “polity.”180 Thus, 
courts should consider the extent of democratic degradation, she says, when the 
boilerplate creates a danger of erasing an entire legislative scheme for many 
persons.181 Furthermore, she believes the most likely candidate for this tort is where 
mass market boilerplate cancels a basic right that should be fully, or at least partially, 
market inalienable.182 
In Radin’s lexicon, “market inalienable” means that the person cannot divest 
himself of the right by contract, even voluntarily. An example would be that a party 
                                                                                                                                          
 177 Moore v. Western Forge Corp., 192 P.3d 427, 432 (Colo. App. 2007) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
876 (1979) (describing three ways in which a person acting in concert may be deemed liable 
for another’s tortious conduct). 
 178 See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 1988 WL 158948 (W.D. 
Wash. July 14, 1988). Cf. State v. Castagna, 905 A.2d 415, 420 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006) (“There is rarely direct proof of intent, and purpose may and often must be inferred 
from what is said and done and the surrounding circumstances, including “‘[p]rior conduct 
and statements [criminal harassment].’”) (citations omitted). 
 179 RADIN, supra note 3, at 215. If the person issuing the abusive, standard form boilerplate 
to the customer is essentially ignorant of the terms, it cannot be said that this party acts in 
concert with the author of the document; see generally Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 26 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 407 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.2005)(“A defendant can be held liable as a co-
tortfeasor on the basis of acting in concert only if he or she knew that a tort had been, or was 
to be, committed, and acted with the intent of facilitating the commission of that tort.”). 
 180 RADIN, supra note 3, at 212, 216. 
 181 Id. at 211. Only one case was found supporting Radin’s argument regarding democratic 
degradation in modern contracting. An Iowa decision not cited by Radin comments in dicta 
that the dominance of form contracts has placed personal rights in a constitutionally suspect 
manner in the hands of private lawmakers without the consent, express or implied, of the 
affected persons. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 
(Iowa 1975). 
 182 RADIN, supra note 3, at 211. 
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is barred from giving up a right where there is “severely problematic consent,” such 
as prohibiting a person from selling himself into slavery.183 “Partially market 
inalienable” means that a trade of the right for money is permissible, but only upon 
the approval by a public institution, such as a court, that reviews or oversees the 
transaction.184 An example of such a transaction would be a consumer’s waiver 
under the U.C.C. of the right to recover consequential damages.185  
When the contract is fully or partially inalienable, as stated above, Radin 
contends that courts should declare these boilerplate contracts invalid in their 
entirety. She even claims that firms deploying boilerplate to erase the consumer legal 
rights that make contractual private ordering possible “[a]re using contract to destroy 
the underlying basis of contract [as well as making] an assault on the underlying 
structure of the polity.”186 When a contract contains such improper terms, Radin’s 
solution is to substitute contracts governed by background legal default rules because 
she believes it is too difficult to sever only the offending clauses.187  This group of 
arguments largely forms the basis for her contention that the deprivation of 
consumer rights stemming from boilerplate contracts has led to democratic 
degradation.  
In Radin’s view, what are the specific circumstances forming the basis for 
“deprivation of basic legal rights”? In Chapter Nine, Radin analyzes the specific 
infractions that can trigger the new tort. Some examples are contractual denials of 
the rights of redress of grievances, the right to a jury trial, the right to free speech, 
and the right to privacy.188 Yet, because of its vague contours, this broad new theory 
of tort liability is necessarily ambiguous because the quoted words—“basic legal 
rights”—lack a standard legal definition. While Radin, in giving examples, does 
attempt to cabin the tort to an extent, her novel restriction to “severe remedy 
deletions” of rights that are least “partially market inalienable” provides inadequate 
guidance for judges and the parties. Equally vague and subjective are her 
“parameters” consisting of:  “(1) the nature of the divested right; (2) the quality of 
consent by recipients; and (3) the extent of social dissemination of a scheme that 
supersedes recipients’ background rights.”189  
Because of the open-endedness of Radin’s typology, the judicial system could 
not apply her formulation fairly or consistently. A constant tug of war would exist 
between plaintiffs, who will contend that most or all legal rights are “basic,” and 
defendants, who will contend that only a narrow “basic rights” category is 
appropriate. As commentators have noted, the elements of a tort and the interests it 
                                                                                                                                          
 183 Id. at 159, 211-12, 286 n.4. “Sheer ignorance” is often associated with this theory, 
Radin contends, and it occurs when another party divests the first party’s entitlement but the 
person “[d]oes not know that is happening, or indeed that anything is happening.” Id. at 21.  
 184 Id. at 157-61. 
 185 Id. at 182. 
 186 Id. at 36, 39, 173; Margaret Jane Radin, An Analytical Framework for Legal Evaluation 
of Boilerplate, (G. Lestas, P. Saprai, & G. Klass eds., Oxford University Press 2014) 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274790#.  
 187 RADIN, supra note 3, at 213. 
 188 Id. at 154-186.  
 189 Id. at 181. 
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seeks to protect should be “adequately defined so as to allow consistent 
application.”190 Another point she overlooks is that the polity in the form of the 
people’s legislature often limits or restricts the so-called inalienable rights through 
supervening statutes, such as congressional action through the Federal Arbitration 
Act, which is a federal law that is paramount over the contracting parties’ contrary 
intent. 191 
Radin further fails to address the high judicial importance placed on setting 
appropriate limits on damages. When parties ask courts to expand tort law duties, as 
per her suggestion, there is frequently “judicial resistance to the expansion of duty . . 
.out of practical concerns . . . about potentially limitless liability. . . .” 192 Her book 
contains little, if any, mention of the problems of imposing excessive monetary 
liability upon defendants and causing a chilling effect on defendants’ heretofore 
legitimate business dealings. Instead, Radin’s overriding objective is to maximize 
consumer rights—preferably through liberal use of class actions—with insufficient 
attention to other legitimate social and economic goals. In essence, after one goes 
through the examples she specifically calls out as possible bases in her Chapter Nine, 
and the vague criteria for defining the tort in the same chapter and elsewhere, the 
proposed tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal rights is subjective and 
undefinable.  
The basic question remains: is tort generally better suited than contract to remedy 
abusive boilerplate? The former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court has 
described very well why the structure of contract is better suited than tort to remedy 
the problems sought to be addressed under, as proposed by Radin, a new residual 
tort: 
Contractual duties are consensual, and even when implied they have the 
virtue of implication from the contract itself. There are well-established 
rules for determining a breach and its consequences. Contract is perhaps 
the most concrete and predictable body of legal doctrine, whose 
application is unlikely to defeat any valid expectation interests of the 
parties . . . Finally, judicial control of the excesses of passionate juries is 
less problematic in contracts than it is in the realm of torts. In contracts, 
the important issues are more often legal than factual, and any 
modification of damage rules would not require the availability of 
punitive damages. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
 190 Comment, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA L.J. 113, 113-14 (1979). Only 
one case was found explicitly approving the concept of “market inalienability,” and that was 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealing with brothels and 
prostitution in Nevada. Coyote Publ’g, Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2010). The court 
ruled that “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy” is a deeply 
rooted notion in our nation’s law and public policy. Id. at 603. The court gave as examples 
selling babies into adoption or selling human organs. The key point is that market inalienable 
means offending the norms of a civilized society and violating public policy. Id. Radin’s 
formulation does not contain or meet these criteria. 
 191 See Bix, supra note 4, at 508 (noting this issue as a weakness in Radin’s book). 
 192 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001). 
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In contrast to the virtues of contract law in general . . . the creation of any 
new tort is fraught with disadvantages . . .  
 
The duties recognized in tort are non-consensual, imposed from without, 
either because of a special relationship between the parties or because of 
perceived public policy implications. Such duties are of necessity 
amorphous, becoming in application little more than matters of degree, 
best suited to resolution by a jury. Tort duties are difficult to judicially 
define or confine; although most courts are content with the enunciation 
of standards, such as “reasonable care,” in defining tort duties, wherever 
courts enunciate particular concrete rules, the process becomes endless, 
with attempts to cover each fact situation specifically as it arises, 
ultimately causing more confusion than clarity as the specific rules 
inevitably conflict.193 
The Alabama jurist’s general comments about the weaknesses of amorphous torts 
apply with equal force to Radin’s new residual tort of intentional deprivation of basic 
legal rights.  
B.  Specific Criticisms of The Proposed Tort 
Some of Radin’s specific areas of concern for the proposed tort are forum 
selection clauses, standard form jury trial waivers, limitations of monetary remedies 
under the U.C.C., and exculpatory clauses regarding seller negligence. Contrary to 
Radin’s doctrinal analysis, a more in-depth examination of the case law will show 
that, in various key ways, the law already has a definite pro-consumer slant and does 
not contribute to democratic degradation. My analysis will further demonstrate that 
the tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal rights in these respects is 
unnecessary and lacks a sound rationale.  
1.  Forum Selection Clauses and the Level Playing Field 
A "forum selection clause,” a common form of boilerplate, designates a 
particular state or court as the jurisdiction where the parties will litigate disputes.194 
Controversy involving these clauses usually occurs where the plaintiff files the 
action in his home state and the defendant moves to dismiss because the complaint 
was not filed in the contractually designated forum.  
Radin maintains that these boilerplate clauses “can effectively deny a remedy to 
injured parties by limiting claimants to bringing suit in jurisdictions that are very far 
away.”195 She also argues courts do not sufficiently apply traditional defenses 
against the enforcement of these clauses, such as the doctrine of unconscionability, 
to protect individual rights.196 Thus, where these clauses generate what Radin 
believes is widespread injustice to consumers, she claims these provisions can 
                                                                                                                                          
 193 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060, 1079-80 (Ala. 1984) (Torbert, C.J., 
dissenting), vacated,  475 U.S. 813 (1986). 
 194 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2014). 
 195 RADIN, supra note 3, at 6. 
 196 Id. at 137-38. 
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 197 
 
support the new tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal rights.197 Radin does 
recognize in a footnote, however, that courts have deemed forum selection clauses 
invalid if the place or manner in which litigation is to occur is unreasonable, such as 
being cost prohibitive, and where the clause effectively denies a party its “day in 
court.”198 
Radin emphasizes that she is not advocating that all choice of forum clauses 
cause an intentional deprivation of a basic legal right for purposes of the new tort. 
She opposes only those clauses that (1) alter the legal infrastructure of redress for a 
large number of persons, (2) are part of a full blown rights deletion scheme that 
undermines the rule of law, and (3) are a form of partial market inalienability that 
causes democratic degradation.199  
Radin’s critique and summary of the law of forum selection clauses is 
incomplete, inconsistent, and incorrect in various ways. She leaves out the salutary 
principles that consider fairness to both consumers and industry and she de-
emphasizes some key consumer-friendly doctrines. The following summary of the 
case law will show these material omissions regarding current legal doctrine.  
In earlier times, courts disfavored forum selection clauses as illegitimate attempts 
to oust courts of their jurisdiction or as otherwise violative of public policy.200 
Today, forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and will be enforceable absent 
the contesting party’s overcoming a “heavy burden of proof” that enforcement would 
be unreasonable or unjust.201 A remote location to the plaintiff, without more, will be 
insufficient to deny enforcement of a choice of forum clause.202  
In the federal courts, where these issues are usually (but not exclusively) 
litigated, three reasons typically can make enforcement of a forum selection clause 
unreasonable: (1) if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of 
fraud or overreaching; (2) if the party wishing to repudiate the clause would 
effectively be deprived of his day in court were the clause enforced; or (3) if 
enforcement would contravene a “strong public policy” of the forum (whether 
declared by statute or court decision) in which suit is brought.203 The doctrinal rules 
                                                                                                                                          
 197 Id. at 137, 146, 183. 
 198 Id. at 282 n.42. (citing decisions).  
 199 Id. at 212, 231. 
 200 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 6, 9, 12 (1972). 
 201 Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Bremen, 
407 U.S. at 17); see also Unique Shopping Network, LLC v. United Bank Card, Inc., 2011 
WL 2181959 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2011) (providing a comprehensive analysis that a forum 
selection clause was enforceable against the asserted grounds that it was unreasonable, unfair, 
ambiguous, overreaching, unconscionable or part of a contract of adhesion). 
 202 Durdahl v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 528 (Wyo.1999) (citing Bremen, 
407 U.S. at 17). 
 203 Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 2013); Haynsworth v. The Corp., 
121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997) (similar four-part test). For an influential case discussing 
when a forum selection clause will be valid, see Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 
383-84 (2d Cir. 2007). Some state courts follow a similar standard. E.g., In re Int’l Profit 
Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Tex. 2009); see also 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 36 (2012) 
(clause not enforceable where it conflicts with an express provision of the Federal Arbitration 
Act).Fraud or overreaching “does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a transaction 
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governing contracts in general will determine the validity of a forum selection 
clause.204  
Radin’s approach to forum selection clauses reveals her philosophical opposition 
to these clauses as opposed to a cogent legal theory for the objection.   Radin 
uniformly maintains a strong preference for consumers and shows little, if any, 
sensitivity to the legitimate needs of industry. What she leaves out is the main public 
policy supporting enforcement of these clauses: both parties’ freedom of contract 205 
and the accompanying judicial respect for party autonomy.206 As with all contract 
terms, “[t]he clear language must be interpreted and enforced as written even though 
it contains terms which may be considered harsh and unjust by a court.”207 
Accordingly, a court when upholding the clause is not limiting the plaintiff’s right to 
choose its forum, but is enforcing the forum that the plaintiff has already 
consensually selected.208   
In effect, the parties entering a valid and reasonable clause agree that the selected 
forum is not so inconvenient that enforcing the clause would be an unfair imposition 
on either party.209 Another way of making same point is that where a forum selection 
clause is valid, the contesting party by signing the contract has waived the right to a 
change of venue on the ground of inconvenience.210 Similarly, the mere fact that the 
designated forum might have less favorable legal principles for a plaintiff is 
immaterial.211 A “strong public policy" (as quoted above) as a basis for overriding a 
                                                                                                                                          
is based upon an allegation of fraud . . . the clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that . . . 
[a] forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the 
contract was the product of fraud or coercion.” Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 963 (quoting Scherk 
v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974)(emphasis added). 
 204 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2014). “The question of the scope of a forum 
selection clause is one of contract interpretation.” John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. V. Cigna Int’l 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1073 (3rd Cir. 1997). Strafford Technology v. Camcar Div. of Textron, 
784 A.2d 1198, 1201 (N.H. 2001) (“It is the intent of the parties that [the forum selection 
clause statute] seeks to exalt . . . .”); see also Unique Shopping Network, LLC v. United Bank 
Card, Inc., 2011 WL 2181959 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (comprehensive analysis that a forum 
selection clause was enforceable against the asserted grounds that it was unreasonable, unfair, 
ambiguous, overreaching, unconscionable or part of a contract of adhesion).  
 205 Hansen Family Trust v. FGH Indus., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 526, 534 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); 
Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va. 1990) (“The rationale 
most often used to support application of the modern rule is that it comports with traditional 
concepts of freedom of contract and recognizes the present nationwide and worldwide scope 
of business relations which generate potential multi-jurisdictional litigation.”). 
 206 See Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forum-selection clauses is a manifestation 
of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional and related matters . . . .”). 
 207 Cf. Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Tenn. 2001) (stating 
general rule). 
 208 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2012). 
 209 In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. 2008). 
 210 Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 211 Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 831 (6th Cir. 2009). This doctrine answers 
Radin’s contention, see RADIN, supra note 3, at 25, 145-46, 231, that choice of law clauses are 
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forum selection clause is one that outweighs the policy protecting freedom of 
contract.212  
Accordingly, Radin leaves out that the courts carefully balance the interests of 
consumers and industry in the administration of these provisions. Forum selection 
clauses advance the “salutary” purposes of enhancing contractual predictability 
(especially with international transactions), reducing the costs of doing business, 
minimizing litigation over forum selection disputes, facilitating judicial economy 
and efficiency, and lowering consumer prices.213 At its essence, a valid forum 
selection provision advances the basic function of contract law, which is “to promote 
commerce.”214 The case law properly preserves fairness to defendants, especially 
where the company does business in many jurisdictions and will be unjustly required 
to defend what would likely be a constant stream of lawsuits in numerous locations 
versus in one place.215  
 An analogy shows the courts’ fair approach to the proper enforcement of forum 
selection clauses. The law’s interest in maintaining a balanced playing field for both 
parties therefore bears affinity with venue statutes, which: “(1) lay venue in a place 
that has a logical connection with the parties to the litigation; and (2) protect the 
defendant against the hardship of having to litigate in a distance place.”216 Indeed, 
many corporations do business in all fifty states and in overseas locations, which 
means that they could be unduly burdened in litigating in “far flung fora.”217 Thus, 
contrary to the impression left by Radin, it will be irrelevant for purposes of this 
issue that a large corporation has a major resource advantage as compared with the 
consumer.218  
                                                                                                                                          
prima facie or even per se improper merely because the drafting party can select a jurisdiction 
with legal standards markedly more favorable to its position than to the other party. Cf. Indus. 
Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128,131-32 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Parties to 
contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal advantage; striving for that advantage is the 
source of much economic progress.”). 
 212 L’Arbalete, Inc. v. Zaczac, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 213 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1972); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 219 (2d 
Cir. 2014); Venard v. Jackson Hole Paragliding, LLC., 292 P.3d 165, 169 (Wyo. 2013); see 
also Solimine, supra note 206, at 52 (“These clauses have many virtues. They permit parties 
to select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to litigate disputes. Such planning 
permits orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships, obviating a potentially 
costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction and venue.”).  
 214 Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 215 See supra note 201 and accompanying cases.  
 216 See Energy Res. Group, Inc. v. Energy Res. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D. Tex. 
1969). 
 217 D’Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 714-15 (D.R.I. 1983).  
 218 Mendoza v. Microsoft, Inc., 2014 WL 842929, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2014) 
(“Plaintiffs also devote extensive briefing to the “Goliath”-like bargaining power of 
Microsoft, recounting Defendant’s “virtually limitless resources” and “thousands of attorneys 
at its disposal”—factors that are irrelevant for purposes of the enforcement of a forum-
selection clause . . . .”). 
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Consistent with their concern for balancing consumer and industry interests, 
courts have not hesitated to strike down a forum selection clause when it violates 
legal standards. A good example of such an unfair and unenforceable forum 
selection clause is one allowing suit in any jurisdiction of a particular party’s 
choice.219 Some courts also apply a stricter standard of reasonableness regarding 
enforceability.220 A key point is the clause to be enforceable must contain language 
indicating the parties’ intent to make venue exclusive, i.e., mandatory and not 
permissive.221 When the clause is permissive, courts use traditional forum non 
conveniens analysis.222 If the clause is oppressive and unconscionable, courts will 
accept this defense.223 While she does briefly touch upon these issues in a footnote, 
Radin fails to give proper weight to these consumer-friendly legal doctrines.224  
One other prominent consumer-friendly doctrine applies to these clauses. 
“Enforceability generally depends on whether the terms of the contracts are beyond 
the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or 
                                                                                                                                          
 219 Central Ohio Graphics, Inc. v. Alco Capital Res., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 2 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 220 See 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLLISTON ON CONTRACTS §15:15 (4th ed. 2009) (so 
characterizing Hall v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 221 Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, 17 F.3d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1994); Paper Express, 
Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 1992); Fireman’s Fund 
McMgee Marine v. M/V Caroline, 2004 WL 287663, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) (“a 
permissive forum selection clause indicates the contracting parties’ consent to resolve their 
dispute in a given forum, but does not require the dispute to be resolved in that forum”); Bohl 
v. Hauke, 906 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, 
Permissive or Mandatory Nature of Forum Selection Clauses Under State Law, 32 A.L.R.6th 
419 (2008). 
 222 See RELCO Locomotives, Inc. v. AllRail, Inc., 2014 WL 1047153 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 5, 
2014). In a typical forum non conveniens case, where the contract has no agreed forum 
selection clause, the district court applies a three-step analysis whereby it (1) determines if an 
alternative forum exists; (2) considers the “relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the 
balance the relevant deference given the particular plaintiff’s initial choice of forum;” and (3) 
weighs the relevant public interest, if the private interests are either nearly in balance or do not 
favor dismissal. Pride Int’l, Inc. v. Tesoro Corp. (US), 2014 WL 722129, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
24, 2014) (citing cases). 
 223 See, e.g., Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 888, 909 (Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding the forum selection provision “unduly oppressive” where small “Mom and Pop” 
franchisees located in California were required to travel to Utah to arbitrate their claims 
against an international carpet-cleaning franchisor); see also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 
469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding Boston forum unconscionable because it was so 
prohibitively expensive that the individual plaintiff was essentially unable to litigate her 
claim). Radin acknowledges this line of authority, but weakly argues that the 
unconscionability doctrine applies in an “unpredictable” manner. RADIN, supra note 3, at 138. 
 224 Radin leaves the impression that decisions disapproving these clauses are rare, RADIN, 
supra note 3, at 146. For a collection of a significant number of decisions denying 
enforcement of a particular choice of forum clause, see Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, 
Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 
31 A.L.R. 4th 404 § 4[c] (1984 & Supp.); 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1148 (2013). 
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unconscionable.”225 This principle advances the traditional skepticism and stricter 
standard of review that courts entertain with respect to adhesion contracts.226 Along 
similar lines, some jurisdictions have ruled "[t]he legal effect of a forum-selection 
clause depends in the first instance upon whether its existence was reasonably 
communicated to the plaintiff”227 and a few states even follow a strong state public 
policy against the enforcement of contractual provisions that mandate resort to a 
foreign forum.228 Again, Radin short-shrifts the protections enjoyed by consumers 
courts properly give weight to the valid concerns of both consumers and industry in 
the administration of forum selection clauses.  
 In a further examination of Radin’s questionable treatment of the case law, let us 
pose a hypothetical that the forum selection clause is valid as a matter of contract, 
but a party seeks a change of venue on grounds of hardship. A typical reason would 
be, as argued by Radin, that the plaintiff opposing the forum selection must incur 
undue expense to travel to a distant site, which also means more burden to the 
plaintiff’s witnesses.229 To what extent may such a challenge succeed? 
To answer this question, I note that after the publication of Radin’s book, the 
U.S. Supreme Court clarified the law of forum selection clauses in Atlantic Marine 
Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.230 In this 
case, the Supreme Court observed that in deciding whether a forum selection clause 
is enforceable, the Court must consider, first, whether the clause is valid and, second, 
whether public interest factors nevertheless weigh against its enforcement “in all but 
                                                                                                                                          
 225 Jenkins v. Marvel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 626, 636 (E.D. Tenn. 2010); see also Unique 
Shopping Network, LLC v. United Bank Card, Inc., 2011 WL 2181959 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 
2011) (providing a comprehensive analysis that a forum selection clause was enforceable 
against the asserted grounds that it was unreasonable, unfair, ambiguous, overreaching, 
unconscionable or part of a contract of adhesion).  
 226 See D’Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D.R.I. 1983) 
(“[I]t is well settled that the existence of boilerplate contracts should give a reviewing court 
pause.”); see generally York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 749 S.E.2d 139, 149 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2013) (stating judicial rule of skepticism). 
 227 Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Altri–Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 910 (3rd Cir. 1988), 
abrogated on other grounds, Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989); see also 
Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[t]he legal effect of a forum-
selection clause depends in the first instance upon whether its existence was reasonably 
communicated to the plaintiff”). 
 228 Some states deem all such clauses unenforceable. Iowa, Idaho, and Montana hold that 
“outbound” forum selection provisions are per se unenforceable, and the latter two states do so 
based upon interpretations of state statutes. See Davenport Machine & Foundry Co. v. Adolph 
Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 435-36 (Iowa 1982); Cerami–Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 
773 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Idaho 1989); State ex rel. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 
471 (Mont.1985); 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:15 (4th ed. 2009). But 
see Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exports Ltd., 28 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing that a state may refuse to enforce forum-selection clauses providing for out-of-
state litigation, as a matter of state public policy, but in a diversity case, federal law would 
apply over a non-discretionary state policy). 
 229 RADIN, supra note 3, at 16-17. 
 230 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). 
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the most exceptional cases.”231 When the parties have agreed to a valid forum 
selection clause, the Court said, but a party brings the case in a different (and 
unauthorized) jurisdiction, a district court should almost always transfer the case to 
the specified forum.232 
The Atlantic Marine Court further ruled that the parties’ and witnesses’ private 
convenience or interests are not valid considerations on change of venue because in 
agreeing to the clause, the parties have waived their right to challenge the 
preselected forum and private interests are no longer part of the equation.233 In 
particular, the moving party’s preference for a particular forum merits no weight.234 
Accordingly, it will be immaterial that the parties’ have private interests in “relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance 
of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of 
a view of premises, if a view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”235 
Instead, the only relevant issues for change of venue under Atlantic Marine are 
public interest factors, and the plaintiff must show on this basis why the transfer to 
the designated forum should not take place.236 Relevant public interest factors can 
include: local interest in the lawsuit, the court’s familiarity with governing law, the 
burden on local courts and juries, court congestion in the court, and the costs of 
resolving a dispute unrelated to the forum.237 (Note that in the above hypothetical, 
the opposing party has raised only insufficient private interests and not the requisite 
public ones.).  
Consistent with the traditional public policies governing forum selection clauses, 
the Atlantic Marine Court emphasized party autonomy, the contractual nature of 
these clauses, and the need for justice as between the parties:  
[W]hen a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified 
forum—presumably in exchange for other binding promises by the 
defendant—the plaintiff has effectively exercised its “venue privilege” 
before a dispute arises. 
. . . . 
When parties have contracted in advance to litigate disputes in a particular 
forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ settled 
expectations. A forum-selection clause, after all, may have figured 
centrally in the parties’ negotiations and may have affected how they set 
                                                                                                                                          
 231 Id. at 581-82; see also id. at 583 (“the party acting in violation of the forum-selection 
clause . . . must bear the burden of showing that public-interest factors overwhelmingly 
disfavor transfer.”). For additional discussion of Atlantic Marine, see Matthew J. Sorenson, 
Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014). 
 232 Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577. 
 233 Id. at 582. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. at 582 n.6. 
 236 Id. at 582. 
 237 Id. at 582 n.6. 
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monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in fact, have been a critical 
factor in their agreement to do business together in the first place. In all 
but the most unusual cases, therefore, “the interest of justice” is served by 
holding parties to their bargain.238 
This unanimous Supreme Court decision giving increased importance to the 
enforceability of consensually-selected forum selection clause makes it practically 
impossible that a lower court would have any interest in Radin’s legal critique of 
these provisions. As for Radin’s normative criticisms, the courts’ emphasis on 
personal autonomy and fairness to both sides is superior to Radin’s unvarnished 
preference for consumers over business defendants.  For all these reasons, Radin’s 
argument is not well-taken that widely used, valid consumer forum selection clauses 
necessarily lead to democratic degradation.  
2.  Jury Trial Waivers and Freedom of Contract 
In arguing for the new tort as she propounds her theory of democratic 
degradation, Radin relies upon the alleged dilution of the consumer’s constitutional 
right to a jury trial that stems from widely used pre-dispute contractual arbitration 
clauses.239 Radin argues that “it is unclear” why American courts permit contractual 
arbitration clauses to waive this right.240  Radin believes that the right to a jury trial 
is market inalienable (non-waiveable) where it is to be supplanted by contractual 
arbitration.241 She also contends American courts “lack argument” to explain why a 
contract can so readily “trump the Constitution,” by which she means the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.242  
The first flaw in Radin’s critique is that she misreads the Seventh Amendment—
the Constitution does not absolutely guarantee a right to a jury trial. Instead, courts 
have stated, “[t]he Seventh Amendment does not confer the right to a trial, but only 
the right to have a jury hear the case once it is determined that the litigation should 
proceed before a court.”243 Therefore, if the parties have an enforceable arbitration 
                                                                                                                                          
 238 Id. at 582-83. 
 239 RADIN, supra note 3, at 16, 17, 85, 108, 131 (stating that arbitration clauses “deprive” 
consumers of “their right to a jury trial”); see also id. at Chapter Three (Radin’s view of 
democratic degradation). 
 240 Id. at 160, 286 n.8. As one commentator points out, the term “waiver” in this context 
should be deleted in favor of “exchange.” The reason is that the consumer receives 
consideration from the merchant in return for giving up the right to a trial by jury. See Stephen 
J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of 
Constitutional Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (2004). Because courts also use the 
phrase “waiver” in this context, I will do the same. 
 241 RADIN, supra note 3, at 160, 286-87 n.8. 
 242 Id. at 286-87 n.8. For commentary similarly critical of the current judicial approach in 
this area, see generally Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997). For a commentary making the 
counter-argument, including a specific rebuttal of Sternlight’s thesis, see Ware, Arbitration 
Clauses, supra note 240, at 181, 188. 
 243 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cremin v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). 
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agreement and a duly authorized arbitrator hears the matter, the consumer has 
voluntarily ceded the choice of permitting a jury to consider his complaint.244 Where 
the Seventh Amendment waiver meets legal standards, the legal and policy basis for 
enforcement is the consumer’s right to freedom of contract and the need to conserve 
judicial resources in an already over-burdened system.245 Given the well-settled 
rationale for the current doctrine, her statement is misplaced that courts “lack 
argument” to explain why a party may contractually waive a constitutional 
guarantee. 
In her next criticism of pre-dispute jury trial waivers, Radin argues that when the 
law improperly allows the “expedient of required arbitration [to] depriv[e] a wide 
swath of the public of any viable remedy from the legal system [this practice] 
undermines the rule of law.”246 This argument has overtones of paternalism as Radin 
wishes to decide for all citizens whether they are barred from waiving certain 
rights.247 Again, courts frequently have explained that parties exercising their 
freedom of contract may waive personal constitutional rights and that Seventh 
Amendment waivers do not offend public policy.248 Many decisions have upheld 
pre-dispute jury trial waivers and an express or implied election to allow 
arbitration.249 Radin also nowhere mentions that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d), a party 
may deemed to have waived the right to a jury trial if the party made an untimely 
                                                                                                                                          
 244 Id; see also Poole v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 337 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2010) (further noting that such pre-dispute waivers can be proper with or without an 
enforceable arbitration agreement). 
 245 See Lowe Enters. v. District Court, 40 P.3d 405, 409 (Nev. 2002); see In re Key Equip. 
Fin. Inc., 371 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting “strong” public policy concerns 
favoring freedom of contract) (jury trial waiver case). 
 246 RADIN, supra note 3, at 137; see also id. at 174 (similar comment). 
 247 See infra Part VI (describing the pro-consumer aspects of arbitration). Cf. Blaylock 
Grading Co. v. Smith, 658 S.E.2d 680, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Gas House, Inc. v. 
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 221 S.E.2d 449, 504 (N.C. 1976)) (Parties “should be entitled to 
contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by the courts . . . .”). The 
argument also erroneously implies that arbitration is generally ineffectual for consumers.  
 248 E.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The seventh 
amendment right is of course a fundamental one, but it is one that can be knowingly and 
intentionally waived by contract.”); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 
(N.D. Tex. 2002) (“Although the right of trial by jury in civil actions is protected by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, that right, like other constitutional rights, may be 
waived by prior written agreement of the parties.”); In re Key Equip. Fin. Inc., 371 S.W.3d at 
301 (public policy allows such waivers). See generally Debra T. Landis, Contractual Jury 
Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED. 688 (1989); Wayne Klomp, Note, 
Harmonizing the Law in Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Jury Waiver Provisions in Contracts, 
6 NEV. L.J. 545 (2005-2006). 
 249 See 3 THOMAS A. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 50:4 (2014) (citing decisions); 
see Ware, Arbitration Clauses, supra note 240, at 171-172 (same). The “loss of the right to a 
jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate.” Pierson 
v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984). 
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 205 
 
request; 250 therefore, no legal basis exists to conclude as an absolute principle that a 
party may not waive the choice to select a jury trial.   
Even with the well-established individual right to dispense with a jury trial, many 
courts remain cognizant of the Seventh Amendment as they take a hard look at these 
waivers. Most jurisdictions allowing pre-dispute waivers of this kind protect the 
consumer’s choice to elect a jury trial “[w]ith a number of safeguards not typical of 
commercial law.”251 These courts deem this choice as being so important that it must 
be “‘zealously guarded’ in the face of a claimed waiver.”252 Decisions have 
emphasized, “[i]t is elementary that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is 
fundamental . . . .”253 Therefore, many courts strictly construe a contractual pre-
dispute jury trial waiver so that it must be knowing and voluntary.254 This judicial 
task calls for a “fact based inquiry” which considers the “totality of the 
circumstances.”255 Contrary to Radin’s implications, many courts do not take lightly 
the contracting party’s abandonment of the guarantee to a jury trial, but indulge 
“every reasonable presumption” against the waiver of this alternative.256   
                                                                                                                                          
 250 Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 251 Treo @ Kettner Homeowners Ass’n v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318, 324 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
 252 Id. While some of the cases in this section do not specifically deal with arbitration as an 
alternative to pre-dispute jury trial waivers, courts have said that similar policy considerations 
apply to any such waiver in a civil case. Id. at 323. 
 253 Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (also stating that 
a “presumption exists against its waiver.”); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (“a 
strong presumption” exists against waiver of the right to a jury trial). 
 254 “Contractual jury waivers do not violate public policy and are enforceable as long as the 
waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and with full awareness of the legal 
consequences.” In re Key Equip. Fin., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. App. 2012); see also 
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Bethany Holdings Grp., LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 224, 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603-
04 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)); see also Neuro-Rehab Assocs., Inc. v. AMRESCO Commercial, 2006 
WL 1704258, at *6 (D. Mass. June 19, 2006) (citing Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., 
303 F.3d 11, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002)); see generally Landis, supra note 248; Klomp, supra note 
248. 
 255 Neuro-Rehab Associates, Inc., 2006 WL 1704258, at *6 (quoting Med. Air Tech. Corp., 
303 F.3d at 19). 
 256 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P’ship, 2013 WL 878754, at *2 (S.D. 
Cal. Mar. 8, 2013); see Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. All Prof’l Realty, Inc., 2012 WL 
2682761, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2012); see Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 
(Mont. 2009); see also Jay M. Zitter, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 
A.L.R.5th 53 §2[a] (1996) (“[M]any cases [state] that since the right to a jury trial is highly 
favored, independent contractual waivers of jury trials, entered into independent of specific 
litigation, will be strictly construed and will not be lightly inferred or extended.”); see also 
Landis, supra note 248, at §2[a] (same). But see In re Key Equip. Fin. Inc., 371 S.W.3d at 301 
(noting that Texas does not apply a presumption against contractual jury waivers). Radin 
appears unaware of the cases applying strict scrutiny because she proposes as a new rule that 
courts should subject to “stricter scrutiny” waiver of the right to a jury trial. RADIN, supra note 
3, at 246. 
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In further promoting consumer rights, most courts adjudicating disputes on jury 
trial waivers employ a complex multi-factor test. They focus on the conspicuousness 
of the provision, the parties’ relative bargaining power, the sophistication of the 
party challenging the waiver, whether the waiving party’s counsel had the 
opportunity to review the agreement, and whether the terms of the contract were 
negotiable.257 No single factor is conclusive and the court is not bound by the 
number of factors that have been satisfied. Rather, the court asks whether, in light of 
all the circumstances, is the waiver unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or 
simply unfair.258 In at least one jurisdiction, Montana, before a party may effectively 
waive the fundamental right to trial by jury, the person must personally consent to 
the waiver in a deliberate and understanding manner after being advised of the 
consequences.259 Another pro-consumer policy is that most federal circuits place the 
burden of non-persuasion upon the party seeking to enforce the waiver to prove its 
validity.260  
Based on the above guidelines, the majority of courts are not so unduly disposed 
toward approving contractual jury waivers as Radin contends in her book.261 In sum, 
this area of the law lends no support to Radin’s argument regarding democratic 
degradation. 
3.  U.C.C. § 2-719 and Limitations of Remedies 
Radin correctly asserts that U.C.C. § 2-719 allows the parties to modify or limit 
Code remedies by agreement.262 The parties may not limit consequential damages, 
however, when the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable, as stated in U.C.C. § 2-
719(3). Thus, it will be prima facie unconscionable under the latter U.C.C. section 
where the parties limit these damages for personal injury arising from consumer 
goods (but the same will not be so for limitations on damages for commercial 
losses).263 Another important point is that under U.C.C. § 2-719(2), where the 
circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy “to fail of its essential 
                                                                                                                                          
 257 Martorella v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 WL 1136444, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
18, 2013) (citing decisions); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising LLC v. Sai Food & Hoispitality, 
LLC, 2013 WL 1092866, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2013); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 
2013 WL 878754, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013); Key Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Poag & McEwen 
Lifestyle Ctrs., LLC, 2010 WL 2696195, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2010) (quoting In re S. 
Indust. Mech. Corp. 266 B.R. 827, 830-31 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)); Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 
P.3d 486, 491 (Mont. 2009). 
 258 Martorella, 2013 WL 1136444, at *2 (citing cases). 
 259 Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 699 (Mont. 2009) (quoting 
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, ¶ 65 (Mont. 2002)) (exhaustive list of factors).   
 260 See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Where waiver is 
claimed under a contract executed before litigation is contemplated, we agree with those 
courts that have held that the party seeking enforcement of the waiver must prove that consent 
was both voluntary and informed.”). But see Med. Air Tech. Corp., 303 F.3d at (noting circuit 
split on which party bears the burden on this issue). 
 261 RADIN, supra note 3, at pp. xiv, 131. 
 262 Id. at 141. 
 263 Id. 
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 207 
 
purpose”264 (explained below), a remedy may be had under chapters 1 to 9 of the 
U.C.C. Radin takes no issues with these propositions. 
As explained more fully below, her analysis become more questionable as she 
describes the effect of U.C.C. § 2-719. According to Radin, U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) 
allows merchants to “severely limit” the buyer’s remedies “without providing that 
such limitations need be communicated especially carefully or that separate consent 
must be obtained.”265 Radin also states that it is “unlikely” that courts applying 
U.C.C. § 2-719 would declare it is unconscionable for a merchant to impose a severe 
curtailment of remedies without any particular warnings to the recipient. She further 
calls these provisions the U.C.C.’s “invitation to shrink remedies” that merchants 
“very widely use.”266 One such merchant maneuver is a boilerplate attempt to cancel 
the consumer’s ability to assert the doctrine of failure of essential purpose.267 
Radin proposes several reforms for the use of U.C.C. § 2-719(2). Her principal 
suggestion is for courts to “make more use of” and to “review more carefully” the 
consumer’s right to invoke any U.C.C. remedy where the contractual remedies under 
the circumstances fail of their essential purpose.268 Another proposed reform is that 
state courts should declare per se unenforceable those clauses “that shrink remedies 
beyond what seems necessary to provide realistic opportunities for redress.”269 Radin 
believes that the U.C.C. and the courts have enabled firms to take unfair advantage 
of consumers with such “remedy slashing.”270Remarkably, Radin in her critique of 
U.C.C. § 2-719 fails to cite the Official Comments thereto or to any case law. 
Nevertheless, is her analysis correct that U.C.C. § 2-719 is defective or that courts 
wrongly have interpreted the U.C.C. consumer protections? Relying on the text of 
U.C.C. § 2-719, the Official Comments, and the decisions, this Article will test 
Radin’s criticisms that merchants have greater rights than consumers under U.C.C. § 
2-719 and that courts need to put “some teeth” into the U.C.C. concept of “failure of 
essential purpose.”271   
                                                                                                                                          
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 RADIN, supra note 3, at 141, 145. Radin claims that U.C.C. § 2-719 “also provides that 
remedies can be very severely limited by contract,” id. at 184, and that the U.C.C. “has a 
permissive stance toward minimizing economic remedies” for aggrieved buyers, id. at 224. 
 268 Id. at 145-46. Radin states that merchants are giving consumers only a “minimalist 
remedy,” id. at 184, and that legislation is needed to clarify U.C.C. § 2-719 on what 
constitutes “fails of its essential purpose,” id. at 224. See also id. at 302-03 n.44 (asserting that 
courts have inadequately enforced U.C.C. § 2-719(2) in light of the underlying principles of 
U.C.C. §1-103 and that courts can do more to enhance consumer rights regarding the scope of 
failure of essential purpose). 
 269 Id. at 147. 
 270 RADIN, supra note 3, at 184. 
 271 Id. 
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The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-719, which merit substantial weight as 
very persuasive authority,272 negates Radin’s contention that U.C.C. § 2-719 
deprives consumers of fair redress or that it unduly favors merchants. Thus, 
according to the Official Comments, the first policy of U.C.C. § 2-719 is to respect 
the parties’ freedom of contract.273 This section gives them the leeway “[t]o shape 
their remedies to their particular requirements.”274 Accordingly, if the parties reach 
“reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies,” courts should give effect to 
such agreements.275 This language shows that the Code seeks to achieve consensus 
and mutual accommodations by both parties subject to reasonable restraints.276 By 
contrast, Radin continually emphasizes consumer rights in her book with little, if 
any, mention of the valid need to support legitimate merchant rights and remedies.277 
Employing a policy protective of both merchants and consumers, Official 
Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-719 provides “[i]t is of the very essence of a sales contract 
that at least minimum adequate remedies be available.”278 In another balanced 
policy, the parties under the same Comment must accept “[a]t least a fair quantum of 
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.”279 Similarly, 
the Official Comments state that under U.C.C. § 2-719(2), if “[a]n apparently fair 
and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to 
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the 
general remedy provisions of this Article.”280 Numerous decisions rely on these 
passages from the Official Comments.281 
                                                                                                                                          
 272 See In re U.S. Ins. Grp., LLC v. Cohutta Banking Co., 429 B.R. 903, 915 (E.D. Tenn. 
2010); First State Bank at Gallup v. Clark, 570 P.2d 1144, 1146 (N.M. 1977) (making similar 
observations about Official Comments on other U.C.C. sections). 
 273 U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (2014) (“parties are left free to shape their remedies”); see also 
U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (2003) (“[F]reedom of contract is a principle of the [Uniform 
Commercial] Code.”); see also Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
and Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 691 (2004) 
(“Freedom of contract provides the fundamental component of Article 2’s structure.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 274 U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (2014). 
 275 Id. 
 276 See, e.g., AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(stating that “Section 2-719 was intended to encourage and facilitate consensual allocations of 
risks associated with the sale of goods”) (emphasis added). 
 277 Radin consistently questions the ethics and integrity of merchants who use what Radin 
believes to be boilerplate rights reduction schemes. For example, Radin accuses them of using 
contract “to destroy the ideal of private ordering” which practice “undermines the rule of law” 
and “contributes to democratic degradation.” RADIN, supra note 3, at 39. See also id. at 36 
(accusing merchants of using purported contracts to erase consumer legal rights and “to 
destroy the underlying basis of contract”). Radin does not seem to entertain the possibility of 
merchant good faith in the use of boilerplate. See also supra note 60 and accompanying text 
(use of boilerplate is not morally inoffensive). 
 278 U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (2014). 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2014) (“Where circumstances cause an exclusive or 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.”); 
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The primary difficulty in this area is how courts should balance the interests of 
buyers and sellers in considering a limited or exclusive remedy. The U.C.C. is 
definitely protective of both parties. While U.C.C. § 2-719 permits the parties to 
limit the remedies available for the buyer, “[l]imitations of remedy are not favored 
. . . and are strictly construed against the seller on the basis of public policy.”282 The 
seller also has the burden of proof to establish the validity of such a limitation.283 A 
further expression of the courts’ solicitude for consumers is that most jurisdictions 
have ruled that “in order for a limitation of remedy to be effective, it must also be 
conspicuous and a buyer must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to read it.”284 
Interestingly, the courts have added this last requirement to U.C.C. § 2-719 even 
though the Code has no actual “conspicuousness” provision.285  
A representative Michigan case nicely illustrates how courts amply safeguard 
buyer prerogatives under the Michigan version of U.C.C. § 2-719.286 Here, the 
plaintiff took over a Mobil Oil dealership without the company’s making him aware 
that the contract excluded the recovery of consequential damages. In holding the 
contract unenforceable on this issue, the decision evidences the law’s protection of 
buyers faced with a severe deletion of rights by a powerful corporation: 
[B]efore a contracting party with the immense bargaining power of the 
Mobil Oil Corporation may limit its liability vis-à-vis an uncounseled 
                                                                                                                                          
id. at cmt. 1 (“[W]here an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails 
in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must 
give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article.”); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 
547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he fundamental intent of section 2-719(2) reflects 
that a remedial limitation’s failure of essential purpose makes available all contractual 
remedies, including consequential damages authorized pursuant to sections 2-714 and 2-
715.”) (citing numerous decisions); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 
A.2d 429, 433-34 (N.J. 1987) (noting the twin objectives of U.C.C. § 2-719 that each party be 
treated fairly). 
 281 E.g., Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619, 625 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
the Official Comments for the statement that “the underlying philosophy of the Uniform 
Commercial Code [is] that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of 
obligations.”); Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Argo Const. Corp., 308 S.W.3d 337, 345 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2009); Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d at 434 (lengthy quote from cmt. 1). 
 282 Cimino v. Fleetwood Enters., 542 F. Supp. 2d 869, 887 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (quoting Perry 
v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)); accord Chemetron 
Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff’d, 522 F.2d 469 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (“Uniform Commercial Code disfavors limitations [on remedies] and specifically 
provides for their deletion if they would act to deprive a contracting party of reasonable 
protection against breach.”). 
 283 See Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Okla. 1978). 
 284 See Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577, 588-89 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing decisions); see also 14 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 40:40 (4th ed. 
2000) (“most courts that have considered the question have declared that a limitation of 
remedies clause must also be conspicuous, despite the absence of a specific statutory 
requirement to that effect”). 
 285 See U.C.C. § 2-719 & Official Comment. 
 286 Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
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layman, as it seeks to do in this case, to ‘difference money damages,’ it 
has an affirmative duty to obtain the voluntary, knowing assent of the 
other party. This could easily have been done in this case by explaining to 
plaintiff in laymen’s terms the meaning and possible consequences of the 
disputed clause. Such a requirement does not detract from the freedom to 
contract, unless that phrase denotes the freedom to impose the onerous 
terms of one’s carefully-drawn printed document on an unsuspecting 
contractual partner. Rather, freedom to contract is enhanced by a 
requirement that both parties be aware of the burdens they are 
assuming.287 
This decision contradicts Radin’s unsupported comment that courts approve 
limitations on remedies “without providing that such limitations be communicated 
especially carefully or that separate consent must be obtained.”288 Simply put, when 
merchant/consumer interests clash regarding application of U.C.C. § 2-719, the need 
to ensure an informed purchaser and to maintain an adequate remedy for the 
consumer outweighs the merchant’s ability to prescribe the terms of sale. 
A related issue in the application of U.C.C. § 2-719 to the point just discussed is 
that U.C.C. § 2-719(3) allows a seller to limit or exclude consequential damages 
unless to do so would be unconscionable. Radin vigorously attacks restrictions on 
award of consequential damages.289 The point of contention is whether the policy 
against a limited remedy failing of its essential purpose defeats a disclaimer of 
consequential damages. One would not know from Radin’s critique that courts have 
devised three approaches (described below) on the availability of consequential 
damages under U.C.C. § 2-719. 
First, a strong line of decisions holds that where the buyer’s exclusive or limited 
remedy fails of its essential purpose, most commonly where the seller fails to 
comply with its “repair or replace” warranty work for non-conforming goods,290 the 
buyer may recover proven consequential damages, even with a contract tem 
excluding them.291 This approach is known as the “dependent approach” because the 
                                                                                                                                          
 287 Id. at 269; see also Am. Nursery Prods., Inc. v. Indian Wells Orchards, 797 P.2d 477, 
481 (Wash. 1990) (“[T]o uphold an exclusionary clause in the consumer sales context, the 
clause must be ‘explicitly negotiated between buyer and seller’, and the remedies being 
excluded must be ‘set forth with particularity.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 288 RADIN, supra note 3, at 141. 
 289 Id. (calling this practice one of the UCC’s “invitation to shrink remedies”). 
 290 Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Argo Const. Corp., 308 S.W.3d 337, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-10 (5th 
ed.)) (noting this circumstance is the most frequent scenario). With a repair or replace 
warranty, courts generally have had little difficulty conceptualizing “failure of essential 
purpose.” See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(repair or replacement remedies went beyond a commercially reasonable time); Liberty Truck 
Sales, Inc. v. Kimbrel, 548 So. 2d 1379, 1384 (Ala. 1989) (remedy will be available where 
seller fails to make repairs within a reasonable time or refuses to make repairs pursuant to the 
warranty). 
 291 See, e.g., Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619, 625 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, 265 N.W.2d 513, 526 (Wis. 1978); see also R.W. Murray, Co. v. 
Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d 266, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1985) (limited remedy’s failure of essential 
purpose voided the contract’s disclaimer for consequential damages). 
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exclusion of the consequential damages exclusion of U.C.C. § 2-719 depends on the 
survival of the limitation of remedy.292  
Second, a majority of jurisdictions follow the “independent” approach.293  The 
independence factor comes into play because this doctrine holds that courts will 
assess a limitation of consequential damages on the merits and enforce it unless 
unconscionable and independent of whether the contract also contains a limitation of 
remedy which has failed of its essential purpose.294 Here, the failure of the limitation 
of remedy and the exclusion of damages are not mutually exclusive.295  
Third, a few courts apply the “case by case” approach.296 Under this variation, 
“[a]n analysis to determine whether consequential damages are warranted must 
carefully examine the individual factual situation including the type of goods 
involved, the parties and the precise nature and purpose of the contract.” 297 This 
theory has minimal appeal because it has no support from the U.C.C. or its official 
comments.298 
The dependent approach is the superior alternative because it is the most faithful 
to the terms of U.C.C. § 2-719 and the Official Comments to this section.299 A 
leading case also opines that it preserves fairness to the parties, especially the 
consumer:  
[a] Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed the [seller] to 
shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when it has allegedly 
repudiated and ignored its very limited obligations under another segment 
of the same warranty, which alleged repudiation has caused the very need 
for relief which the [seller]is attempting to avoid.300 
As U.C.C. remedies must be “liberally administered,” per U.C.C. § 1-106(1), so that 
the aggrieved party is put in as good a position as if the defaulting party had fully 
performed,301 the dependent approach properly ensures that the seller bears the risk 
the limited remedy could fail.302  
                                                                                                                                          
 292 See Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ill. 2006); Kearney & Trecker 
Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429, 436 (N.J. 1987); Daniel Hagen, Note, Sections 
2–719(2) & 2–719(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Limited Warranty Package & 
Consequential Damages, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 111, 116-17, 128-29 (1996). 
 293 See Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 616-17. 
 294 See id.; Kearney & Trecker Corp., 527 A.2d at 436; Hagen, supra note 292, at 117, 129-
31. 
 295 See Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 617. 
 296 See Hagen, supra note 292, at 131. 
 297 AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978); see 
Hagen, supra note 292, at 117, 131-34. 
 298 See Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 617-18.  
 299 See R.W. Murray v. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d 266, 272-73 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 300 Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Jones & McKnight v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43-44 (N.D. Ill. 1970)). 
 301 See, e.g., S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 859 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting CAL. COM. CODE § 1106(1) (West 1964)); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 
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In the final issue regarding § 2-719, Radin flippantly says “whatever that means” 
about the definition of the failure of essential purpose doctrine.303 The cases, 
however, are legion in explaining this concept in careful detail.304 Courts say that 
under U.C.C. § 2-719, “[a] limited remedy fails of its essential purpose when an 
unexpected circumstance arises and neither party accepted the risk that such 
circumstance would occur.”305 The basis for whether a limited remedy has failed of 
its essential purpose involves a two-step process. First, the court must decide the 
essential purpose of the limited remedy.306 Second, the court must determine whether 
the remedy has not succeeded in meeting that purpose.307 Numerous similar 
formulations exist for this U.C.C. § 2-719 concept.308  
Under U.C.C. § 2-719(2), court have said, the concept of “failure of essential 
purpose” has the following additional components. First, “a remedy’s essential 
purpose ‘is to give to a buyer what the seller promised him.”309 This provision helps 
ensure that each side receives the “benefit of its bargain,” and further reflects that “it 
is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be 
available.”310 Therefore, the analytical focus “is not whether the remedy 
compensates for all damage that occurred, but that the buyer is provided with the 
                                                                                                                                          
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-106(1)); see also U.C.C. § 1-
103(a) (the Code shall “be liberally construed to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies”). 
 302 See Soo Line R.R. Co., 547 F.2d at 1370. 
 303 RADIN, supra note 3, at 141; see also id. at 224 (doctrine is “vague”). 
 304 See infra note 308. 
 305 67A AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 848 (2013). 
 306 4B ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE U.C.C. § 2-719:128 (3d ed.). 
 307 Id. 
 308 E.g., Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 
427, 431 (6th Cir. 1983) (circumstances that cause exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its 
essential purpose refer to where it is “exceedingly impractical” to carry out essence of agreed-
upon remedy); Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1099-1100 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (failure of essential purpose may occur as result of an inherent quality defect, 
for example, where the defect cannot be cured, where it is impossible to discover which of 
many parts had created the defect, or where the defect has completely destroyed entire 
product); J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 549 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), 
appeal dismissed, 377 A.2d 1 (Del. 1977) (factors to be considered in determining whether 
contractual limitation on liability fails of its essential purpose are: facts and circumstances 
surrounding the contract; nature of basic allegations of the party, nature of goods involved; 
uniqueness of experimental nature of the items; general availability of the items; and the good 
faith and reasonableness of the provision); Midwest Hatchery & Poultry Farms, Inc. v. 
Doorenbos Poultry, Inc., 783 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (where repair or 
replacement remedy is not sufficient a court may find the remedy failed of its essential 
purpose).  Another alternative for when a remedy will fail of its essential purpose is when 
“defects in the goods are latent and not discoverable on reasonable inspection.” See Marr 
Enters. Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 309 Midwest Hatchery, 783 N.W.2d at 62-63. 
 310 Potomac Constructors, LLC v. EFCO Corp., 530 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736 (D. Md. 2008). 
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product as the seller promised.”311 Put another way, “[f]ailure of essential purpose . . 
.is concerned with the essential purpose of the remedy chosen by the parties, not 
with the essential purpose of the code or of contract law, or of justice and/or 
equity.”312 Thus, if the event in question defeats a primary contractual objective, and 
the possible occurrence of that event would have been outside the contemplation of 
the parties at contract formation, this circumstance can qualify as a “failure of an 
essential purpose” of the contract. Compare the above in-depth case law treatment of 
“failure of essential purpose” with Radin’s dismissive comment about the quoted 
U.C.C. language. The conclusion must be that Radin’s criticism is not well-taken.313 
For Radin, the take-away is that U.C.C. § 2-719 “provides that remedies may be 
severely limited” and that it invites merchants to “shrink remedies,”314 but the fact is 
consumers enjoy robust rights under this provision. After fully assessing the 
authorities, another commentator observes about U.C.C. § 2-719, “[c]ourts have 
generally favored the unsophisticated consumer, and have left the wealthy, well-
advised industrial giants to fend for themselves.”315 More importantly, the leading 
commentators on the U.C.C., professors White, Summers and Hillman, correctly 
indicate that U.C.C. § 2-719 reflects a pro-consumer perspective when they state in 
their treatise that “it is hard to find any [other] provision in Article 2 that has been 
more successfully used by aggrieved buyers in the last [25] years than Section 2-
719(2).”316 Accordingly, this area of the law in no manner supports Radin’s 
argument pertaining to democratic degradation. 
4.  Exculpatory Clauses for Seller Negligence 
As another basis for a proposed tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal 
rights, Radin contends that broad exculpatory clauses for seller negligence as against 
the buyer for injuries stemming from furnished goods or services should be 
proscribed unless consumers have the choice to trade off rights for a lower price.317 
She also says that exculpatory clauses have become so favorable to merchants that, 
absent “exceptional circumstances,” “many people injured through the fault of a 
business they deal with are precluded by the company’s paperwork from holding the 
company legally accountable.”318 
Radin cites no statistics or case law for the above empirical questions. In her 
brief legal analysis, Radin also fails to mention that under case law, the public policy 
of freedom of contract generally permits both parties to freely and knowingly enter 
                                                                                                                                          
 311 Midwest Hatchery, 783 N.W.2d at 62-63.  
 312 Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Argo Const. Corp., 308 S.W.3d 337, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 313 RADIN, supra note 3, at 141;see also id. at 145-46 (arguing incorrectly that courts do not 
make sufficient use of this doctrine). 
 314 Id. at 141. 
 315 Karl S. Yohe, The Inherent Ambiguity Of Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-719: 
‘Failure Of Essential Purpose’ v. ‘Unconscionability,’ 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 523, 524 (1987). 
 316 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT E. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE § 13:19 (6th ed. 2012). 
 317 RADIN, supra note 3, at 184-85. 
 318 Id. at 7. 
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contracts exonerating a merchant of goods or services from his acts of future 
negligence as against the purchaser.319 For this reason, Radin’s proposed near-total 
ban on such contracts would offend public policy. At the same time, notwithstanding 
freedom of contract principles, she does not capture that there are other doctrines 
making such exculpatory provisions “not favored” and “strictly construed” against 
the benefiting party;320  
The importance of this principle in its practical results cannot be 
overestimated. Though only a rule of construction, it effectively changes 
the outcome in the majority of cases in which the defense is made that 
liability for negligence was excluded by a contractual provision.321 
Additionally, to protect the buyer, the courts say that clear, unambiguous, 
unmistakable, and conspicuous language is required to release a seller from his or 
her future negligence.322 There must be “no doubt” that a reasonable person agreeing 
to an exculpatory clause actually understands what future claims he or she is 
waiving.323 Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the word “negligence” must be clearly 
stated in a release of future negligence.324 Another principle is that no matter what 
the level of bargaining that exists between the parties, many jurisdictions will not 
enforce exculpatory agreements to protect a promisor’s future recklessness, gross or 
willful negligence, or a future intentional tort or crime.325 The decisions also hold 
                                                                                                                                          
 319 E.g., Hussein v. L.A. Fitness Int’l, L.L.C., 987 N.E.2d 460, 465 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013); 
Miller v. A & R Joint Venture, 636 P.2d 277, 278 (Nev. 1981). 
 320 Hussein, 987 N.E.2d at 465; Topp Copy Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (Pa. 
1993);see also Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 742 (Conn. 2005) (striking 
down clause based on the guiding principles of the tort system). 
 321 K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision by One Other than 
Carrier or Employer for Exemption from Liability, or Indemnification, for Consequences of 
Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 92 (1948). 
 322 See, e.g., Hanks, 885 A.2d at 739; Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 
330, 337 (Mo. 1996); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 
1993) (applying the doctrine that “a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of that 
party's own negligence must express that intent in specific terms within the four corners of the 
contract”).  
 323 Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337-38; Wright v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 663 A.2d 
1340, 1342 (N.H. 1995) (determining “whether the plaintiff understood the import of the 
agreement, and if not, whether a reasonable person in [her] position would have known of the 
exculpatory provision”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nissley v. Candytown Motorcycle 
Club, Inc., 913 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (upholding an exculpatory clause that “a 
reasonable person would have understood, from the very beginning, [to be a waiver of] all 
rights to bring a claim, without qualification”).  
 324 E.g.,  Hussein, 987 N.E.2d at 465; Guthrie v. Hidden Valley Golf and Ski, Inc., 407 
S.W.3d 642, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see also Agric. Aviation Eng’g Co. v. Bd. of Clark 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 794 P.2d 710, 712–13 (Nev. 1990) (good summary of numerous interpretive 
principles requiring strict construction). 
 325 Hanks, 885 A.2d at 747-48 (citing cases); Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 600 
N.W.2d 214, 222 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]n exculpatory contract exempting a party from 
tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is void as against public policy.”) 
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that before an exculpatory clause will be construed against the party seeking to avoid 
liability, such a clause to be valid must “spell out the intention of the parties with 
great particularity.”326 These last mentioned doctrines confirm that “[i]t is generally 
held that exculpatory provisions must meet high standards for clarity.”327 Radin does 
not mention these critical points in her discussion of this topic.  
Other nuances exist in this area showing close (pro-plaintiff) judicial attention—
i.e., “strict scrutiny”—to clauses limiting the liability of a party.328 To be enforceable 
against the consumer, the clause must not be too broad, i.e.: (1) consistent with the 
seller’s need for protection in legitimate business activity; (2) neither unduly harsh 
nor oppressive to the consumer; and (3) not harmful to the public.329 Thus, courts 
construing a seller’s exculpatory clause will include the public interest as a factor 
regarding enforceability.  This public interest element helps ensure fair treatment for 
the consumer.  
Citing an influential 1963 California Supreme Court decision330 the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Olson v. Molzen331 followed the majority rule in adopting the 
following criteria for deciding when an exculpatory provision impairs the public 
interest: 
(1) It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation. 
 
(2) The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of 
great importance to the public, which is often a practical necessity for 
some members of the public. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
(internal quotation marks omitted); Brooten v. Hickok Rehab. Servs., LLC, 831 N.W.2d 445, 
448 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013); Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Twp., 60 A.3d 1, 24 (Md. 2013). 
 326 Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 642 S.W.2d 20, 26 (Tex. App. 1982).   
 327 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:22 (4th ed. 2010);see also 
Brooten, 831 N.W.2d at 449 (“[T]he form, looked at in its entirety, must alert the signer to the 
nature and significance of what is being signed.”). 
 328 See Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Duke Levy & Assocs., LLC, 475 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
 329 Jesse v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1, 8 (Idaho 2008). 
 330 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). Radin states, “A few 
courts may still adhere to the older view that such clauses are generally unenforceable [as] 
delineated in a California case from the early 1960s [Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963)].” RADIN, supra note 3, at 139, 282 n.46. To the contrary, 
contemporary decisions frequently refer to Tunkl as “[t]he leading case on determining 
whether an exculpatory clause within a contract violates public policy.” H.K. Supermarket, 
Inc. v. Magteec Inv. Co., 2005 WL 534233, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005);accord Dalury 
v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 798 (Vt. 1995) (“Numerous courts have adopted and applied the 
Tunkl factors.”) (citing decisions); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 48 P.3d 70, 84 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2002) (referring to Tunkl as the “widely followed if not leading decision” in this area). 
 331 Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977). 
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(3) The party holds itself out as willing to perform this service for any 
member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member of the 
public coming within certain established standards. 
 
(4) As a result of the essential nature of the services, in the economic 
setting of the transaction, the party seeking exculpation possesses a 
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the 
public who seeks the services. 
 
(5) In exercising a superior bargaining power, the party confronts the 
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no 
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and 
obtain protection against negligence. 
 
(6) As a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser 
is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness 
by the seller or its agents.332 
This doctrine of an agreement “being affected with the public interest” differs 
from whether the clause violates public policy.333 “Simply stated, and in its most 
basic form, the public policy exception provides that exculpatory provisions which 
violate public policy are at the very least unenforceable, and may be void in their 
entirety and therefore a legal nullity.”334 
The Olson case mentioned above emphasized that not all six factors need be 
present for a court to invalidate the exculpatory clause, although such a provision 
that has at least some of these characteristics generally would be unacceptable.335 In 
the application of this policy, no one factor is dispositive because each case depends 
upon “the totality of the circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of 
current societal expectations.”336 The Olson criteria also go beyond the contract type 
construed in that decision, which was for professional services.337 Under the 
decisions, even legitimate business motivations or a pecuniary exchange, while 
relevant, will not necessarily validate the exculpatory clause.338 These well-known 
policies strike a proper consumer/merchant balance of power even though Radin 
does not mention these case law doctrines in any depth. 
                                                                                                                                          
 332 Id. at 431. 
 333 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:22 (4th ed. 2010). 
 334 Id.  
 335 Russell v. Bray, 116 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 
431) (striking down clause where four of the six criteria were present). 
 336 Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 744 (Conn. 2005) (also citing 
variations on the Tunkl doctrine); 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Twp., 60 A.3d 1, 24 (Md. 
2013). 
 337 E.g., Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758-59 (Tenn. 1992) (landlord-tenant 
case). 
 338 See Childress By & Through Childress v. Madison Cnty., 777 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
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In fact, some states go further than their sister jurisdictions and hold that all 
exculpatory agreements purporting to release tortfeasors from future liability for 
personal injuries yet to occur are unenforceable.339 The same result of 
unenforceability exists for exculpatory terms in favor of a business affected with the 
public interest, such as a common carrier, where the transaction occurs when the 
business has acted under its public duties.340 Another important consideration in 
some jurisdictions is that “[e]ach party must be a free bargaining agent to the 
agreement so that the contract is not one of adhesion.”341 Indeed, some courts are so 
skeptical about the validity of these clauses that these terms may be close to being de 
facto illegal in these jurisdictions. Thus, in 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
mentioned, “[i]ndeed, each exculpatory contract that this court has looked at in the 
past 25 years has been held unenforceable.”342 A 2013 Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
decision observed along the same lines, “[s]uch clauses have been, are, and will 
continue to be, looked upon with disfavor.”343  
As can be seen, the actual state of the law on exculpatory clauses is substantially 
pro-consumer. It differs materially from the law Radin depicts on the supposed 
inadequate judicial oversight.344 It also negates her contentions about the presence of 
democratic degradation.  
C.  The Severability of Improper Boilerplate 
Radin overstates the difficulty of excising any offending clauses from mass 
market boilerplate. She observes, 
My preliminary suggestion is that a purported contract containing 
offending boilerplate should be declared invalid in toto, and recipients 
should be governed by the background legal default rules. I am proposing 
invalidation in toto and recurrence to existing default rules, because it is 
much harder for courts to sever and excise only certain clauses . . . .345 
Radin argues that this difficulty of severing offending boilerplate supports her new 
tort of intentional deprivation of basic legal rights.346 As explained below, no such 
difficulty exists and so her normative critique continues to lack the essential 
predicate of a need to revise the law. 
                                                                                                                                          
 339 E.g., Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co., 41 A.2d 920, 922 
(N.H. 1945); Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 895-96 (Va. 1992). 
 340 Childress, 777 S.W.2d at 4. Radin appears unaware of these decisions. See RADIN, 
supra note 3, at 145 (proposing as if an original suggestion that exculpatory clauses be 
“severely limited”). 
 341 Topp Copy Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 626 A.2d 98, 99 (Pa. 1993). 
 342 Rainbow Country Rentals & Retail, Inc. v. Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., 706 N.W.2d 95, 105 
(Wis. 2005). 
 343 Brooten v. Hickok Rehab. Servs., LLC, 831 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013). 
 344 RADIN, supra note 3, at 184 (criticizing courts for “immunizing” sellers from having to 
answer for their culpable injuries to other persons). 
 345 Id. at 213. 
 346 Id. (observing that the difficulty in judicial severing of clauses justifies invalidation of 
such contracts in their entirety). 
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The legal standard is well-settled. Where a contract clause is void as against 
public policy or otherwise is unenforceable, a court may sever just that clause and 
enforce the remainder of the contract.347 A contract clause can be severed and a 
contract may survive if a court can delete an illegal clause without defeating the 
primary purpose of the bargain348 or where the parties intended that the contract may 
stand despite an offending term.349 Courts regularly accomplish these excisions but 
Radin leaves an inaccurate impression on this point.  
Another important aspect of this issue is where the problem at hand is a clause 
that goes to the plaintiff’s available remedy.350 Modern courts generally view 
remedial provisions, when they are unenforceable, as “easily separable” from the 
contract such that the surviving terms remain fully in effect.351 Provided that no 
indication exists the parties have intended otherwise, such an offending remedial 
term can be severable.352 Courts following this view properly reason that if they 
rejected the request of a party that belongs to the protected class to excise the 
prohibited provision, the law would penalize the protected party by including a 
suspect clause and reward the targeted party by retaining the improper term.353 
Therefore, Radin’s argument is not well-taken that courts should necessarily deem 
the entire contract “invalid in toto” just because it has some offending boilerplate.354  
Lastly, Radin leaves unmentioned a related non-waiver doctrine that enhances 
the rights of both the consumer and of the public. A strong public policy protects 
individual rights where a statute confers a particular right on a private party and that 
statute affects both the individual’s interests and the public interest. An example 
would be where a contract contradicts the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).355 This 
statutory program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., prescribes standards for the basic 
minimum wage and overtime pay affecting most private and public employment.356 
                                                                                                                                          
 347 Dawson v. Goldammer, 722 N.W.2d 106, 111–12 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 184 (1981).  
 348 Dawson, 722 N.W.2d at 111-12;see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 
(1981) (stating the rule of partial enforcement with the omission of an offending but not 
essential provision). 
 349 See Farina v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 66 F.3d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1995);see also Broadley v. 
Mashpee Neck Marina, Inc., 471 F.3d 272, 275 (1st Cir. 2006) (court may sever or modify 
overbroad exculpatory clause). 
 350 Ind. Dep’t of Transp. v. Shelly & Sands, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001) (noting that the particular exculpatory clause “limits the remedy”);see also Aetna 
Workers' Comp Access, LLC v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., 746 S.E.2d 148, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) 
(exculpatory clauses “restrict remedies”). 
 351 Dawson, 722 N.W.2d at 111–12 (citing GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 89.10 at 659 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2003)).  
 352 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); Hill v. NHC 
HealthCare/Nashville, LLC, 2008 WL 1901198, at *7 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008).  
 353 Dawson, 722 N.W.2d at 112. 
 354 RADIN, supra note 3, at 213.  
 355 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2012). 
 356 Jenkins v. Sara Lee Corp., 2008 WL 731265, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2008). 
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In this circumstance, the employee may not waive or release his rights to FLSA 
compensation where the waiver or release would undermine the statutory objective 
in protecting the individual employee and the public.357  
Radin could have—but did not—rely on this last-mentioned general principle to 
argue that all rights granted by the polity, such as the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial, enjoy similar protection because they protect both the individual party and 
the public interest in effective judicial processes. No cases were found considering 
either way this potentially valid argument for the topics analyzed in this section.  
What can be said is that the law in this area seeks to counteract, not condone, 
democratic degradation.  
V. BOILERPLATE AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
Radin argues “we should take seriously” that unfair boilerplate contracts qualify 
as a defective product under the law of products liability.358 Radin observes that 
“onerous or oppressive ‘legal-ware’ poses product safety issues instead of issues of 
contractual consent under a system of private ordering.”359  
Radin’s suggestion is not well taken. In the law of products liability, a “product” 
is generally “tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or 
consumption.”360 Therefore, Radin overlooks that the written contract itself—which 
are merely pieces of paper—does not meet this definition. The contract memorializes 
an intangible item, which is the actual agreement of the parties.361 Although a 
document delivers the information, the plaintiff’s grievance in such a case is with the 
content of the document, not with the tangible medium itself.362 Therefore, it 
becomes apparent that boilerplate may not serve as the predicate for a cause of 
action sounding in tort.  
Even if a contract with unfair boilerplate were a “product” for the above 
purposes, it is not “defective” as a basis for tort liability. “A product is defective 
when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is 
defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings.”363 Abusive contract boilerplate is not defective under the Restatement 
                                                                                                                                          
 357 Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945); Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ., 
37 A.3d 625, 654-55 (Conn. 2012). 
 358 RADIN, supra note 3, at 101, 198. 
 359 Id. at 101. 
 360 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19(a) & cmt. b. (1998). For a 
collection of state statutes and case law, see id. at reporters’ cmt. a.; AMERICAN LAW OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d §§ 16:61-62 (Richard E. Kaye ed., 2013); David W. Lannetti, Toward 
a Revised Definition of “Product” Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
55 BUS. LAW. 799 (2000). 
 361 John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1342 (1975) (calling this 
principle “[o]ne of the unassailable rudiments of contract law”). 
 362 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19(a) cmt. d. (1998). 
 363 Id. at § 2.  
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definition because it is at most merely a defective idea.364 Radin apparently agrees 
with this observation because she concedes that the “harms” inflicted by boilerplate 
“are not harms to the (composite) product” because the boilerplate “still 
functions.”365 Thus, she makes the strained argument that the composite product 
(boilerplate) is still “defective” because “it should be unenforceable under the 
circumstances.”366  
Compare Radin’s approach on “harm” to how most products liability statutes 
address this point. For example, under Ohio law, “harm” means “death, physical 
injury to person, serious emotional distress, or physical damage to property other 
than the product in question [and also excludes ‘economic loss’].”367 Contract law 
does not give rise to the type of tort damages contemplated by products liability 
law.368 
Lastly, Radin’s attempted reliance on products liability law for defective 
boilerplate departs from the doctrine’s established policies. “Products liability grew 
out of a public policy judgment that people need more protection from dangerous 
products than is afforded by the law of warranty.”369 As stated by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, Section 402A,  
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, 
by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and 
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming 
public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does 
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to 
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; 
that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused 
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market 
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability 
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is 
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the 
proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.370 
The gist of a remedy for deficient boilerplate is to address the consumer’s 
expectation interest in the parties’ contract for the provision of goods or services. In 
                                                                                                                                          
 364 See Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publ’ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 76, 78-79 (Haw. 1992) 
(no cause of action in products liability for defective ideas).  
 365 RADIN, supra note 3, at 214. 
 366 Id.  
 367 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(7) (West 2007);accord Ford Motor Credit Co., 
LLC v. Mendola, 48 A.3d 366, 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“[A] ‘products liability’ 
cause of action is available only for claims arising from personal injury or damage to property 
other than the defective product itself.”) (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1(b)(2)). 
 368 Radin accepts that her proposal targets injury to the consumer’s rights even though 
“[p]roducts liability has been primarily aimed at physical injury to persons or property.” 
RADIN, supra note 3, at 215. Her short response is that her proposal “should be distinguished 
to some extent from previous applications of defective product liability.” Id.  
 369 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).   
 370 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. c. (1965). 
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other words, the plaintiff in an abusive boilerplate case suffers only economic 
loss.371 By comparison, products liability statutes typically exclude economic loss.372 
Accordingly a claim unsupported by proof of physical harm to persons or property 
(besides the product itself) does not invoke the policies supported by products 
liability.373  
Because Radin’s new tort cannot meet these important pre-requisites of products 
liability law —“product,” “defect” and “harm”— her proposal for a new tort must be 
found wanting. Indeed, Radin herself concedes that “[p]erhaps the contract-as-
product amalgam breaks down here”374 and that the intentional tort theory “[w]ould 
be of better service than products liability.”375 Nevertheless, Radin does not 
unambiguously renounce this proposed new theory376 and so it must be emphasized 
that Radin overlooks that the economic loss rule precludes relief in tort actions for 
consequential losses that are merely economic.377 
VI. CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION: ENGINE OF CONSUMER OPPRESSION OR 
LEGITIMATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM? 
Arbitration is “the process whereby parties voluntarily agree to substitute a 
private tribunal for the public tribunal otherwise available to them.”378  Radin is 
intensely critical of contractual arbitration as what she views is a vehicle for mass 
market consumer rights deletion schemes.379 She proposes that mass market 
mandatory consumer arbitration be “disallowed” where it is an improper form of 
“full-blown democratic degradation.”380 Accordingly, this next section of the Article 
will examine Radin’s contention that contractual arbitration undermines the civil 
justice system.  
A. Radin’s Objections to Contractual Arbitration 
Radin repeatedly indicates that contractual arbitration is a blight on the U.S. 
economy and is the primary reason for democratic degradation. Her objections are 
                                                                                                                                          
 371 Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(2) (West 2007) (“‘Economic loss’ means 
direct, incidental, or consequential pecuniary loss.”). 
 372 See supra note 367 and accompanying citations. 
 373 See Carter v. Brighton Ford, Inc., 251 P.3d 1179, 1183 (Colo. App. 2010). 
 374 RADIN, supra note 3, at 214-16. 
 375 Id. at 215. 
 376 Id. at 101 (calling her proposed concept of products liability “a serious idea”); id. at 198 
(stating that the proposal includes the notion that boilerplate qualifies as a basis for products 
liability).  
 377 Id. at 214-16. “[I]n the absence of an accident, there can be no action in negligence to 
recover the loss of the economic value of a defective product, unless there is some personal 
injury or damage to other property.” Vulcan Materials Co., Inc. v. Driltech, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 
253, 254 (Ga. 1983).  
 378 Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 468 A.2d 91, 95 (Md. 1983).   
 379 E.g., RADIN, supra note 3, at 183 (stating that mandatory arbitration clauses improperly 
“erase the right” to a jury trial and frequently to class action relief).  
 380 Id.  
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that pre-dispute contractual arbitration (1) bypasses the consumer’s right to 
collective remedies, such as class actions and class arbitration,381 (2) results in 
decisions rendered in secret without precedential value and rarely subject to 
appellate review,382 (3) uses arbitrators that are usually business persons who are 
more sympathetic to merchants than consumers,383 and (4) is inefficient because it is 
secret, ad hoc and nonprecedential.384 Indeed, her antipathy goes so deep that she 
accuses the U.S. Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal arbitration statutes 
of condoning “invidious” racial or sexual discrimination and of “underwriting 
democratic degradation” by “making redress impossible, in practice if not in theory, 
for large numbers of people.”385 Thus, for Radin, the current arbitration system is 
inconsistent with the “rule of law.”386 
Although Radin says that a mandatory arbitration clause must be disallowed 
when it creates a mass-market rights deletion scheme,387 legislatures and courts do 
not share Radin’s implacable (and overheated) opposition to contractually designated 
arbitration.388  She also overlooks that the polity as the voice of the people in the 
form of the national legislature is the same body that has enacted the broad sweep of 
federal arbitration.389 
As a reflection that federal and state court hostility to arbitration “is a thing of the 
past,”390 the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has been in effect since 1925.391 By law, 
arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”392 Courts will 
                                                                                                                                          
 381 RADIN, supra note 3, at 132-33. 
 382 Id. at 134. 
 383 Id.  
 384 Id. 
 385 Id. at 183. 
 386 Id. at 135. 
 387 Id. at 183. In 123 references, Radin in a negative connotation repeatedly couples “mass 
market boiler plate” with the word “scheme.” See, e.g., id. at 35, 38, 39, 174. The dictionary 
definition of “scheme” when used negatively is “an underhanded plot.” See DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/scheme?s=t (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). Radin never 
refers to mass market boilerplate in a positive light.  
 388 Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing 
cases).  
 389 See Polity Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
POLITY?s=t (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 390 The main reason for this hostility was that “[p]arties were considered incapable of 
ousting the courts of their jurisdiction by contract.” Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 152 (explaining 
former judicial policy against arbitration). 
 391 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Halligan v. Piper 
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 392 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395, 404 n.12 (1967) (“congressional purpose was to make arbitration agreements as 
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so”). 
60https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 223 
 
uphold contractual arbitration provisions if they “[a]re sufficiently clear, 
unambiguously worded, satisfactorily distinguished from the other Agreement terms, 
and drawn in suitably broad language to provide a consumer with reasonable notice 
of the requirement to arbitrate all possible claims arising under the contract.”393  
Despite the impression left by Radin, this form of commercial arbitration is never 
“mandatory,” as she uses this term repeatedly, 394 but is designed to be a matter of 
the open and fair contractual consent of both parties.395 Properly understood, 
“mandatory arbitration” requires arbitration pursuant to a contract clause if either of 
the parties elects to pursue it; “permissive” arbitration pursuant to a contract clause 
requires arbitration only with consent of both parties. “In other words, a party cannot 
be compelled to arbitrate a dispute he has not [contractually] agreed to submit.”396  
Accordingly, when each party to an arbitration agreement “fully and clearly 
comprehends” that disputes are subject to this procedure, it will be enforceable.397  
Courts further state“[t]here is nothing inherently unfair or oppressive about 
arbitration clauses”398 and that arbitration agreements are not necessarily adhesive or 
unconscionable.399 Far from being inherently oppressive and unfair to plaintiffs, the 
law in the interpretation of contractual arbitration employs a solicitous standard of 
consent that liberally favors the consumer. Thus, in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the requirement for the consumer’s knowing consent 
                                                                                                                                          
 393 Curtis v. Cellco P’ship, 992 A.2d 795, 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 394 RADIN, supra note 3, at 280, 284, 289.  Radin inappropriately mixes notions of 
“compulsory arbitration” with “mandatory arbitration.” The latter is contractual and 
consensual; the former is prescribed by statute and does not require the party’s consent. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). A good example in the former situation is in the 
labor relations context. See In re Bd. of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. 710 N.E.2d 
1064, 1067 (N.Y. 1999). 
 395 Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State 
Constitutional Jury Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 41-43 (2003). 
 396 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1976); see also Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) 
(arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.”). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 
et seq., places arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Scherk v. 
Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . 
courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts.”). 
 397 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-32 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 398 Coleman v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986), and 
decisions cited therein.  
 399 Id. at 1352; Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So.2d 592, 597-98 (Ala. 1998); see also Carter 
v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (“there is nothing 
per se unconscionable about arbitration agreements”); Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C. v. Reynolds, 
151 S.W.3d 868, 874-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (despite disparate bargaining power between the 
parties, pre-printed form contracts are enforceable as long as an “average member of the 
public who accepts [such a contract] would reasonably expect disputes involving whether 
either party was in default under its terms to be subject to arbitration rather than litigation.”).  
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applies with “particular force” to arbitration agreements whereby such terms must 
demonstrate “clarity and conspicuousness.”400   
Of course, as with any other area of contract law, there will always be those 
individuals that attempt to take advantage of their contracting partners. On those 
occasions where a merchant uses or drafts an arbitration clause improperly, the 
consumer’s potential defenses include laches, estoppel, waiver, fraud, duress, 
reasonable expectations, public policy and unconscionability.401 Thus, generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may 
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening the Federal Arbitration Act, 
provided that the local state law or practice does not single out arbitration contracts 
for suspect treatment.402 The reasonable expectations defense, mentioned above, is 
especially friendly to consumers. It provides that “[d]espite disparate bargaining 
power, pre-printed form contracts are enforceable as long as an “average member of 
the public who accepts [such a contract] would reasonably expect disputes involving 
whether either party was in default under its terms to be subject to arbitration rather 
than litigation.”403 Therefore, even with an adhesion contract, a court will not 
enforce an arbitration provision against a weaker party if (1) arbitration is not within 
the party’s reasonable expectations or (2) arbitration is within the party’s 
expectations but it is unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy.404  
Additionally, some jurisdictions follow the pro-consumer doctrine that an 
arbitration clause will be unenforceable if it contains a “substantial waiver of a 
parties’ rights.”405 A similar interpretive doctrine favoring consumers and 
disfavoring merchants, the rule of contra proferentum (ambiguities construed most 
strongly against the drafter), applies to arbitration clauses just as with other 
contractual terms.406 Based on the case law, contract law is a proper and potent 
vehicle for protecting consumer interests given the numerous potential defenses 
available against the enforcement of unfair arbitration agreements. 
                                                                                                                                          
 400 Specht, 306 F.3d at 30. 
 401 Zigrang v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 123 P.3d 237, 242 (Mont. 2005); Spann v. 
Am., Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 224 S.W.3d 698, 711 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). In a 
recent Executive Order, President Obama has prohibited companies with federal contracts of 
$1 million or more from requiring their employees to enter into pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements for disputes arising out of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or from torts related to 
sexual assault or harassment (except when valid contracts already exist). Fair Pay and Safe 
Workplaces, 79 Fed. Reg. 150, 45314 (July 31, 2014). 
 402 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (2000) (also stating “ [c]ourts 
may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions”). 
 403 Greenpoint Credit, 151 S.W.3d at 874-75. 
 404 Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 994–95 (Mont. 1999) (calling such a provision 
“void”). If the form contains a material, risk-shifting clause, the court may excise the clause as 
being unconscionable where the signer would not reasonably expect to encounter it in such a 
transaction. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 405 Valued Servs of Ky., LLC v. Watkins, 309 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).  
 406 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1979); Perez v. Qwest 
Corp., 883 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1118 (D.N.M. 2012); Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 
444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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Nevertheless, Radin firmly rejects the proposition that arbitration proceedings are 
usually fair to both sides as she is quite dubious of the impartiality of the 
proceedings. 407 In an important case, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
expressly rejected the “outmoded presumption” and “suspicion of arbitration as a 
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law.”408 The Court 
also has refused to “indulge in the presumption that the parties and the arbitral body 
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, 
conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”409 As stated in another influential Court 
decision, “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of 
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of 
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”410 Indeed, “[t]here is 
reason to believe that arbitration clauses lower the contract price of the goods, 
services, or money, or provide weaker parties with more advantageous terms, 
because arbitration reduces the parties’ joint costs of contracting.”411 
Given the realities of arbitration, which Radin never meaningfully addresses, this 
alternative dispute resolution technique is “[n]ot inherently pro-business or anti-
consumer.”412 The incidence of arbitration also is not as widespread as Radin has 
argued. One recent study concludes,  
The vast majority of credit card issuers do not utilize arbitration clauses, 
and by the end of 2010, the majority of credit card debt was not subject to 
such an agreement. Likewise, while the use of class waivers is widespread 
                                                                                                                                          
 407 RADIN, supra note 3, at 130-35. 
 408 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
 409 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991). While arbitration 
dispenses with many of the formalities of a trial, it still requires a fair procedure. See 
Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 494 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2007); Sheldon v. 
Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001); Rembert v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 
Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); see also Sampson v. Judicial Arbitration & 
Mediation Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 1892686, at *4 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008) (“We are 
unaware of any instance where the fair procedures doctrine has been employed to remove an 
arbitrator in a private arbitration, and we shall not so employ it in this case.”). 
 410 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 
(1985); see also Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1366 (2012) (“Reputable organizations like the American 
Arbitration Association have incentives to provide reasonably fair arbitration procedures in 
order to preserve a reputation for evenhandedness.”). 
 411 Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 480 
(2012); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act 
and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 472 (2011) 
(“in the vast majority of consumer arbitrations, consumers pay fewer fees than they would in 
court, obtain results faster than they would in court, and win greater relief than they would 
likely win in court”). 
 412 Jones v. General Motors Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1138-39 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
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in arbitration clauses, most clauses lack the sort of unfair procedural terms 
for which arbitration is often criticized.413 
After carefully canvassing the literature, the same study concluded that much of the 
commentary hostile to arbitration is “decidedly not empirical.”414 Therefore, Radin 
has overstated any systemic problems associated with arbitration.  
B. The Benefits of Contractual Arbitration 
In examining Radin’s anti-arbitration bias, the preceding section also touched 
upon some of the benefits of contractual arbitration. This section will build upon that 
analysis.  
A “strong” public policy favors arbitration over litigation because arbitration is 
expeditious, avoids litigation delays, relieves court congestion, results in lower 
expense and does not violate the constitutional or statutory right to trial by jury.415 In 
the words of the California Supreme Court,  
The speed and economy of arbitration, in contrast to the expense and 
delay of jury trial, could prove helpful to all parties; the simplified 
procedures and relaxed rules of evidence in arbitration may aid an injured 
plaintiff in presenting his case. Plaintiffs with less serious injuries, who 
cannot afford the high litigation expenses of court or jury trial, 
disproportionate to the amount of their claim, will benefit especially from 
the simplicity and economy of arbitration; that procedure could facilitate 
the adjudication of minor . . . claims which cannot economically be 
resolved in a judicial forum.416 
Regarding Radin’s comment that arbitration is inefficient because it is secret, ad 
hoc and non-precedential, she is actually arguing that arbitration should be more like 
formal litigation. If two parties can settle a dispute in private, without the aid of 
arbitration, it will be equally secret, ad hoc and non-precedential. Such settlements 
occur every day but no court or commentator finds that process particularly 
                                                                                                                                          
 413 Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2013). 
 414 Id. at 10 n.30 (collecting articles). For a comprehensive analysis of the criticisms of 
unfair arbitration clauses, see Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (2001). 
 415 Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186-87 (Cal. 1976); Wheeler v. St. 
Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782-83 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters  at Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective, 857 A.2d 893, 905 
(Conn. 2004) (lengthy discussion of the benefits of arbitration); Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & 
Co., 914 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tenn. 1996); Maguire v. King, 917 So.2d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (public policy generally favors arbitration, and all doubts regarding the scope of 
an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration, when practicable).  
 416 Madden, 552 P.2d at 1186. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that arbitration 
(1) is “cheaper and faster than litigation,” (2) has “simpler procedural and evidentiary rules,” 
(3) “minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among 
the parties,” and (4) is “more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and places of hearings 
and discovery devices.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 
(1995) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 (1982)).  
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objectionable. The only difference between private settlements and contractual 
arbitration is that the private settlements typically have the adversaries bargaining on 
the issues, frequently with “sturm und drang” (stress and turmoil), whereas 
contractual arbitration allows selection of a neutral third party expert(s) whom the 
parties expect will resolve the matter based on the law and the facts in a rational, 
even-handed way. 
In essence, Radin’s comment that arbitration is inefficient because it is secret, ad 
hoc and nonprecedential417 reveals a misconception of the nature and purposes of 
this alternative dispute resolution technique. Arbitration “[i]s a private system of 
justice offering the benefits of reduced delay and expense.”418 As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has remarked, “[a]rbitration is an 
alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes, and an extremely low standard of 
review is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added 
preliminary step to judicial resolution rather than a true alternative.”419 Another 
decision has cogently observed: 
Maximum deference is owed to the arbitrators because the parties have 
contracted to use binding arbitration rather than litigation as a means to 
resolve their disputes. . . . By agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration.420 
As just indicated, an additional benefit of arbitration is the avoidance of most 
follow-on judicial proceedings by either side with the attendant prospect of extra 
delay and cost. The parties therefore can rely more upon the finality of the 
arbitrator’s determination than a trial court’s judgment because they will have the 
assurance with a later challenge that the arbitrator’s decision will stand absent 
exceptional circumstances.421 While an arbitration proceeding must comply with 
                                                                                                                                          
 417 See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 418 Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 419 Local 879, Allied Indus. Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Chrysler Marine Corp., 819 F.2d 
786, 788 (7th Cir. 1987).  
 420 Hosier v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D. Colo. 2011) 
(citations omitted); see also Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (“Such limited review is necessary if arbitration is to serve as a quick, inexpensive 
and informal means of private dispute resolution.”). For these reasons imposing a requirement 
upon the arbitrator to explain his decision (absent the parties’ agreement otherwise) “[w]ould 
serve only to perpetuate the delay and expense which arbitration is meant to combat.” Eljer, 
14 F.3d at 1254.  
 421 Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Once an 
arbitration award is entered, the finality of arbitration weighs heavily in favor of supporting 
the arbitrator’s decision and cannot be upset except under exceptional circumstances”). 
  Radin also objects that arbitrators as a class are inherently biased because they are 
business persons necessarily more sympathetic to merchants than consumers. See supra note 
383 and accompanying text. To the contrary, the arbitrator’s expertise and knowledge of the 
subject matter is a plus for the process and not an automatic indicator of bias see Morelite 
Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 
1984) (“parties agree to arbitrate precisely because they prefer a tribunal with expertise 
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statutory law,422 the standard of review under the Federal Arbitration Act is 
“extremely narrow and exceedingly deferential.”423 Here, the court “[m]ust sustain 
an arbitration award even if [a court] disagree[s] with the arbitrator’s interpretation 
of the underlying contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision ‘draws its essence’ 
from the      contract.”424  
As a result, arbitration has greater potential for achieving more durable outcomes 
than conventional litigation because reviewing courts give wider deference to the 
judgment of arbitrators. These advantages can be even more pronounced in the 21st 
century with the increasing globalization of consumer trade where arbitration might 
be the only practicable method for deciding disputes between parties in far-off 
locations.  
No doubt exists that some commentators strongly disagree with the current 
judicial interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act. The main source of this 
dissatisfaction is that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted what one commentator 
calls “the contractual approach to arbitration law,” which means that “[c]ourts must 
enforce agreements to arbitrate unless contract law provides a ground for denying 
enforcement.”425 These Supreme Court decisions, especially, have generated 
unusually bitter (and even disrespectful) criticisms in the literature. One writer, for 
                                                                                                                                          
regarding the particular subject matter of their dispute”); see also Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. 
v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992) 
As arbitrators are usually knowledgeable individuals in a given field, often they have 
interests and relationships that overlap with the matter they are considering as 
arbitrators. The mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge will not 
disqualify an arbitrator . . . . To set aside an award for arbitration partiality, “[t]he 
interest or bias . . . must be direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than 
remote, uncertain or speculative. 
Id. 
 422 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 423 Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.), Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 186 (1st Cir. 
2012). Actually, the scope of review is indeed limited but broader than what the cases 
sometimes discuss. The federal statute provides the following grounds to vacate an award: (1) 
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there was evident partiality 
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct 
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). Some courts also recognize a common law 
ground for vacating arbitration awards that are in “manifest disregard of the law,” Bangor, 
695 F.3d at 187 (noting split of authority); see generally Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an 
Error: Replacing “Manifest Disregard” with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration 
Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (2012). Radin mentions none of these exceptions to the 
enforcement of these awards. 
 424 Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 
2012).  
 425 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law (With a 
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Hagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 195 (1998) (citing 
views of various commentators). 
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example, has stated that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act shows its bias 
“for the comparatively richer and more powerful litigant” and that “the Court’s 
pronounced, but intellectually inconsistent, preferences for arbitration reflects a 
reckless, impure, or tainted love.”426 In a second example, a different commentator 
has argued that “[i]n sum, if the Supreme Court will not change its course, Congress 
must act quickly to prevent companies from using arbitration as a tool of oppression, 
rather than to achieve justice.”427 In a third commentary, one set of authors call the 
issuers of mandatory arbitration agreements “birds of prey” who “sup on workers, 
consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees” and concludes that these 
agreements are “sometimes a method for stripping people of their rights.”428 
Interestingly, all these authors focus almost entirely on pre-dispute arbitration but 
voice little concern with the fairness of post-dispute arbitration agreements, i.e., 
where the parties agree to arbitrate an existing dispute.  
The more dispassionate commentators correctly observe the Supreme Court 
“[h]as faithfully applied the Federal Arbitration Act, which itself explicitly enacted 
the contractual approach to arbitration law.”429 These scholars also point out that the 
pro-consumer nature of arbitration has been “generally overlooked.”430 Further, these 
authors have shown that, based on the established economics principle of “rate-of-
return equalization,” the existence of competition forces businesses to pass on the 
cost-savings (that often results from the contract arbitration) to consumers.431 More 
generally, the facts are that “[g]eneral enforcement of adhesive arbitration 
agreements benefits society as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, 
benefits most consumers, employees and other adhering parties.”432 Contrary to the 
beliefs in some academic circles, courts exposed on a daily basis to the work-a-day 
                                                                                                                                          
 426 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in 
Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 795 (2012); see 
also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral 
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1996) (“arbitration 
zealots . . . including most of the Supreme Court . . . ride roughshod over individual rights and 
basic notions of fairness in the heat of pursuing a popular current goal.”). 
 427 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 712 (1996). 
 428 Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 
331, 401 (1996). 
 429 Ware, supra note 426, at 195. 
 430 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Good Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001). 
 431 Id. at 89; Stephen J. Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 277-
78 (2006) (also noting how judicial regulation of arbitration agreements increases the dispute-
resolution costs of the businesses and the costs for both businesses and consumers). Radin 
rejects this economic principle without adequate explanation. RADIN, supra note 3, at 31. 
 432 Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, supra note 432, at 
264.   
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business world properly hold that the mere existence of an arbitration clause in a 
contract does not favor either party.433 
Giving no weight to the courts’ experience with arbitration, Radin aligns herself 
with the commentators opposing the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. As 
with these other critics, Radin in using some intemperate language does not 
adequately explain why the contractual approach is incorrect.434 She also makes no 
attempt to give her readers a balanced presentation of the arbitration process or to 
explain why state and federal courts at every level uniformly endorse arbitration as a 
fair and proper procedure.435   
Despite Radin’s unyielding (and over the top) opposition to contractual 
arbitration, such as her inexcusable comment accusing the U.S. Supreme Court of 
condoning widespread racial and sexual discrimination in America,436 the available 
evidence suggests that arbitrators “decide cases much as judges do” and “with less 
cognitive distortion than juries.”437 Arbitration can also be an inherently more fair 
and accurate method of case resolution than conventional litigation because the 
parties are not bogged down by “[p]retrial substantive motions, discovery wars, 
antiquated rules of evidence or juries that allowing clever [or fumbling] advocates to 
skew the results.”438 For all the above reasons, some jurisdictions state that 
arbitration is a “favorite of the law.”439  
                                                                                                                                          
 433 EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90–91 (Tex.1996); see also Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (stating that by avoiding the delay 
and expense of litigation, arbitration will appeal to big business and little business alike as 
well as to corporations and individuals).  
 434 See RADIN, supra note 3, at 183 (stating that the Court has allowed discrimination 
against “large numbers of people,” and has failed to construe the Act consistent with the 
“original intent”). 
 435 See Public Policy Favoring Arbitration, 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 3, 1 (2013) (“Arbitration 
agreements to resolve disputes between parties have received near universal approval”). 
Indeed, state courts in the interpretation of state arbitration statutes have adopted the federal 
policy. E.g., Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 742 (Md. 2005) (“The same policy 
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements is present in both our own and the federal 
acts.”). 
 436 RADIN, supra note 3, at 183 (stating the Court has “underwritten democratic 
degradation” on these grounds). 
 437 Burton, supra note 412, at 480. 
 438 Id. at 480-81; see also Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 
supra note 432, at 259 (making similar comparison); see also David Sherwyn et al., Assessing 
the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1557, 1578 (2005) (“[T]here is no evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly better in 
litigation.”). 
 439 Valley Const. Co., Inc. v. Perry Host Mgmt. Co., Inc., 796 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1990); see also  Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 915 (Cal. 1997) 
(noting the presumption in favor of arbitrability). But see Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 
1000, 1008 (Wash. 2007) (“Congress simply requires us to put arbitration clauses on the same 
footing as other contracts, not make them the special favorites of the law.”).  
68https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/11
2014] EXPANDED MERCHANT TORT LIABILITY 231 
 
C. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: The “Final Nail in the Coffin of Aggregate 
Federal Remedies?” 
Radin’s main criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law on federal 
arbitration policy, which she says deprives plaintiffs of the right to employ mass 
remedies, is the 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.440  In 
Concepcion, the Court applied the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and held that it 
pre-empted a California law stating that class action arbitration waivers in a contract 
are unconscionable.441 Radin accuses the Court majority of being biased in favor of 
corporate defendants, both in hobbling states trying to protect their consumers and 
increasing “[t]he risks to plaintiffs, who could be deprived of all remedy against a 
firm free to gouge them out of small amounts . . . .”442 
Radin’s analysis of the Supreme Court’s Concepcion case has various 
shortcomings. Primarily, Radin’s statement is readily rebutted that the Court in 
Concepcion “drove the final nail into the coffin of aggregate legal remedies for 
consumers.”443 What Radin leaves out of her discussion is the Concepcion Court’s 
observation, “[o]f course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns 
that attend contracts of adhesion—for example, requiring class-action-waiver 
provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.”444 These words are 
hardly the statement of a Supreme Court bent on obliterating consumer aggregate 
legal remedies. Instead, the Court’s comments show that as long as states do not 
single out arbitration contracts for disparate treatment as compared with other 
contracts, such aggregate remedies are permissible.445  The “nail” that Radin 
references is not in sight and there is no body in the coffin. 
Even more dubious is her statement that “[b]y deploying an arbitration clause, a 
firm also deletes recipients’ right to bring a class action suit.446 This statement 
misapprehends the law because of the rule that “there is no right to litigate a claim as 
a class action.”447 Given the green light the Concepcion Court has given the states to 
                                                                                                                                          
 440 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 441 Id.at 1753. 
 442 RADIN, supra note 3, at 133 
 443 Id. at 133. Other commentators use similar hyperbole about the perceived effect of 
Concepcion. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (noting that Concepcion “[w]ill 
provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful 
acts without fear of being sued”); id. at 726 (arguing that if lower court interpretations of 
Concepcion stand, “[w]e are providing companies with licenses to cheat and harm almost at 
will.”). 
 444 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6. 
 445 Id. at 1747–53. 
 446 RADIN, supra note 3, at 17; see also id. at 101 (arguing against contract clauses that 
involve relinquishing one’s “right to bring a class action in court”); id. at 173 (mass market 
contracts that exclude class actions use private tools to dispose of a public “right” of redress). 
 447 AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (enforcing 
arbitration clause which prohibited class-action claims, stating that “there is no entitlement to 
proceed as a class action”); see also supra note 68 (making same point). 
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“address the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion,”448 Radin also incorrectly 
suggests that a state under Concepcion may not mandate that “arbitration clauses be 
foregrounded rather than buried in fine print.”449  
Furthermore, Radin fails to make a persuasive argument that Concepcion was 
wrong on the pre-emptive power of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) over contrary 
state law. Instead, the Court did its homework in patiently explaining why 
California’s law striking class action waivers impaired federal statutory policy on 
arbitration. Class-wide arbitration is at odds with federal policy, the Court said, and 
impedes the national policy effectiveness of the FAA in the following ways: (1) it 
“sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the 
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than 
final judgment;” (2) it requires procedural formality” because of due process 
concerns, i.e., “for a class action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, 
class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class members, 
and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right 
to opt out of the class; ”and (3) it ”greatly increases risks to defendants” and “is 
poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” because of the lack of judicial 
review that will take place regarding huge awards, thus rendering arbitration 
unattractive.450 Radin makes no effort to analyze these positions, preferring instead 
to condemn arbitration in general because she believes it creates a system of ad hoc, 
unreviewable, unreported and biased pro-business decisions.451 
Even given these weighty reasons justifying the Concepcion’s majority’s 
position, plaintiffs can use some creative techniques to avoid Concepcion’s 
preclusive effect upon the enforceability of class action waivers. As one 
commentator observes, “Concepcion is not necessarily the death knell for class-wide 
arbitration.”452  
The following avenues for collective action remain viable after Concepcion. For 
example, after the decision in Concepcion, another Supreme Court case, American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, left open the possibility that an arbitration 
agreement or class action waiver would be invalid where the high cost of arbitration 
or other factors would make the vindication of statutory rights impossible or 
extremely impracticable.453 In a second exception, Concepcion does not 
automatically preclude a contract formation defense based upon 
                                                                                                                                          
 448 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 n.6. 
 449 See RADIN, supra note 3, at 294 n.44; see also id. at 131 (arguing that a state consumer 
protection agency “probably cannot require that an arbitration clause be printed in bold type”). 
 450 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 198 (Cal. 2013) (summarizing 
Concepcion). 
 451 RADIN, supra note 3, at 133-34. 
 452 Don Zupanec, Class Arbitration—Federal Arbitration Act—Title VII Claim, 26 No. 10 
FED. LITIGATOR 9 (2011). 
 453 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013). Under 
the “statutory rights” doctrine, the merchant and consumer may agree to decide the 
consumer’s statutory rights by way of arbitration instead of by litigation, but only “so long as 
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate the statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
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unconscionability.454 In a third qualification, a defendant can be held to have waived 
a Concepcion defense.455 Then again, in Figueroa v. THI of New Mexico at Casa 
Arena Blanca, LLC, 456 the New Mexico Court of Appeals distinguished 
Concepcion, reasoning “[b]ecause our invalidation of the ban on class relief rests on 
the doctrine of unconscionability, a doctrine that exists for the revocation of any 
contract, the FAA does not preempt our holding.”457 
Radin herself acknowledges that some courts are “[f]ind[ing] a way around 
Concepcion.”458 Indeed, prominent commentators have stated that “Concepcion 
leaves open and unresolved the viability of a state law challenge to a bilateral 
arbitration clause which is shown, in a particular case, to impose a forfeiture of the 
claimant’s ability to vindicate his state law rights.”459 Also, several commentators 
have concluded that class wide arbitration remains a viable remedy within the 
confines of the FAA.460 Given these viable alternatives remaining extant, Radin’s 
                                                                                                                                          
 454 Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (procedural 
unconscionability); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC,135 Cal. Rptr.3d 19, 28-29 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 455 Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1277–80 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendant waived 
right to arbitrate by twice denying that it sought arbitration but where it changed its mind and 
requested arbitration after the Supreme Court decided Concepcion). 
 456 Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 457 Id. at 485. But see THI of N. M. at Hobbs Center, LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (rejecting Figueroa as conflicting with federal arbitration policies). In New York, 
because of the strong public policy favoring arbitration and the absence of a similar policy 
supporting the right to bring a class action lawsuit, a contractual prohibition against a class 
action is neither unconscionable nor violative of public policy. Ranieri v. Bell Atlantic 
Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
 458 RADIN, supra note 3, at 279 n.21. Even as they castigate the Supreme Court for its 
decision, other critics of the decision also grudgingly concede that viable theories for 
challenging arbitral class waivers have survived Concepcion. See, e.g., Sternlight, Tsunami, 
supra note 444, at 713-16(citing state and federal decisions).  
 459 Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” 
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 826 
(2012). 
 460 E.g., Brian J. Murray, I Can’t Get No Arbitration: The Death of Class Actions That 
Isn’t, At Least So Far, SEP 60 FED. LAW. 62, 62 (2013)) (“Class actions have proven resilient, 
however, marching onward with the assistance of courts and agencies working to winnow 
Conception’s [sic] scope”); Jerett Yan, The Lunatic’s Guide To Suing For $30: Class Action 
Arbitration, The Federal Arbitration Act After AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 551, 553 (2011) (“Far from the cataclysm predicted by critics, the impact of 
Concepcion in the lower courts has been modest. Most courts interpreting Concepcion simply 
read the decision as having pruned one of the most far reaching forms of unconscionability 
doctrine, leaving the bulk of the unconscionability jurisprudence intact.”). Ted Frank, Class 
Actions, Arbitration And Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion Is a Pro-Consumer Decision, 16 
LEGAL POLICY REPORT, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/lpr_16.htm#.VGu7cMlNci4 (“Overall, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Concepcion has not led, and should not be expected to lead, to a broad 
erosion of consumer rights, as some alarmists have predicted.”). Another court has deemed 
Concepcion inapplicable where the class action waiver and other arbitration clauses were so 
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statement is puzzling that the Supreme Court in Concepcion has driven “the final 
nail into the coffin of aggregate legal remedies for consumers.”461 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Radin makes a spirited, but ultimately flawed, argument that courts should create 
one or more new torts to combat the perceived evils of boilerplate. As indicated 
throughout this Article, the creation of a new cause of action in tort must accord with 
the need and reason for tort liability in general and the legal system’s need to adjust 
to changing social conditions. This Article further has shown in great detail that 
Radin’s new torts are not necessary or beneficial because the law in numerous 
respects adopts a pro-consumer perspective on the enforceability of boilerplate 
contracts that amply protects legitimate consumer interests.  
While no thoughtful proposed major shift in contract doctrine should be rejected 
out of hand, any credible new policy must be steeped in at least the fundamental 
doctrines of contract law to have any chance of adoption. Because a valid normative 
argument about the contracting system must proceed from an accurate statement of 
the key doctrinal principles, no such possibility exists with Radin’s radical overhaul 
of the guiding principles of both contract and tort. 
Even assuming that the law’s response to the problems of mass market standard 
form contracts has been insufficient, Radin’s proposal to transform abusive mass 
market boilerplate contracts into a fount of tort liability in favor of the consumer is 
counterproductive. Her proposal would very likely create unintended adverse 
consequences for the same individuals that Radin strives so mightily to protect. The 
main problem would be that the expanded liability of sellers arising from Radin’s 
suggested reforms would necessarily cause sellers to impose price increases to 
account for this added seller legal exposure. In Original Great American Chocolate 
Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd.,462 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit observed: 
[t]he idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of contract disputes 
can redistribute wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of judicial 
power. It comes from failing to consider the full consequences of legal 
decisions. Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably shift the balance 
of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they can only make 
contracts more costly to that side in the future, because [the other side] 
will demand compensation for bearing onerous terms. 
                                                                                                                                          
confusing and inconsistent that the arbitration terms were unenforceable. NAACP of Camden 
Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 794 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2011).  
 461 RADIN, supra note 3, at 279 n.22 (emphasis added). Other commentators properly 
caution against an overly critical interpretation of the supposed adverse effects of this 
decision. See, e.g., Rutledge &  Drahozal, supra note 69, at 961 (“only a handful of 
franchisors have switched to arbitration clauses since Concepcion”); Myriam Gilles & Gary 
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 623, 628 (2012) ([A] too-broad reading of Concepcion may collide with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that provides agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims are fully 
enforceable, but only ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.’”).  
 462 Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 
273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992).  
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Balanced with commonsense levels of statutory and regulatory oversight, and fair 
rules of competition, the more the contracting rules support the free market system, 
the more both consumers and merchants will benefit. As stated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
“[c]ompetition among vendors . . . is how consumers are protected in a market 
economy.”463 Radin, however, places no faith in the free market and advocates 
intrusive regulation on all consumers regardless of their means or abilities.464 For the 
above reasons, I respectfully contend that Radin fails to prove her case that the 
expansion of merchant tort liability to resolve any issues with boilerplate contracts is 
necessary to remedy any subjectively-perceived democratic degradation.465 
  
                                                                                                                                          
 463 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).  
 464 As this Article was going to press, as revealed by Westlaw, no court opinion has cited 
Radin’s book and just two parties have cited Radin’s book in their briefs. See Westlaw, 
“Allcases” and “All-briefs.” Thus, it appears that her book has had little, if any, impact on 
courts and practitioners. 
 465 Radin confines her analysis to mass market consumer standard form contracts but 
devotes almost no attention to the many business-to-business boilerplate contracts that 
constitute a significant portion of the American contracting system. Many small business 
owners could be functionally indistinct from ordinary consumers. The closest she comes to 
this comparison is a footnote in Chapter One commenting that contracts between business 
entities “are more likely to instantiate freedom of contract than those involving consumers.” 
RADIN, supra note 3, at 251 n.6.  Radin’s book would have benefited from a comparison of 
boilerplate consumer contracts with boilerplate business contracts. Does she also contend that 
these boilerplate business contracts cause democratic degradation? While Radin is entitled to 
establish the scope of her analysis, covering this point would have broadened the value of her 
book. 
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